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ABSTRACT 
Russia’s agricultural sector has experienced profound and fundamental change over the 
past two decades in response to the dissolution of institutions built under the Soviet 
regime.  The relative chaos of the 1990s gave way to increased state intervention under 
Presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev, contributing to a broad agricultural 
recovery.  The present study examines the possible future course of agricultural 
development by presenting three scenarios depicting the challenges and opportunities the 
sector may face within alternative development contexts. 
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I. WHITHER RUSSIA?  
There has been no shortage of attempts to address the question around which the 
present work centers: Where is Russia headed?  The query is implicit in nearly every 
commentary on economic and political affairs both domestically and abroad.  As has 
frequently been the case in Russia, there is a tension between the country’s desire to be 
part of the European West, and a conservative political culture that remains deeply 
suspicious of foreign ideals and influences.  This tension has so far prevented the country 
from fully embracing liberal democratic and economic principles.  Nowhere is the 
dichotomy more apparent than in the countryside, where economic and political 
liberalization have collided with the innate conservativism of rural Russia.  On the one 
hand, these ideas have held out the promise of reversing the chronic underproductivity of 
Soviet agriculture.  Yet, they also have demanded a major reordering of social and 
economic relations.  Both villagers, and rural elites, have consistently attempted to 
preserve elements of the status quo in the face of this reordering, fearing its implications.  
While it is impossible to definitively say how this contest will ultimately be decided, it is 
possible to explore possible alternatives and infer resulting impacts.  This work will 
present arguments regarding the prospects for Russian agriculture over the next decade 
under three divergent scenarios, each depicting alternative futures the country may 
experience. 
A. DEVELOPING SCENARIOS FOR RUSSIA’S FUTURE 
Several groups have developed scenarios laying out possible political and 
economic paths Russia may elect to pursue in the coming years.1  The aim of futures 
research is not to prophesy what will come to pass, but rather to develop a framework for 
                                                 
1  Kaare Stamer Andreasen and Jakob Kelstrup, Russian Prospects: Political and Economic Scenarios 
(Copenhagen: Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies,[2005]).; Osmo Kuusi et al., Russia 2017: Three 
Scenarios (Helsinki: The Parliament of Finland, The Committee for the Future,[2007]).; World Economic 
Forum, Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025 (Geneva: World Economic Forum,[2006]).; Vladimir 
Milov, "Russian Economy in Limbo," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://russia-
2020.org/2010/07/13/russian-economy-in-limbo/ (accessed March 24, 2011). 
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evaluating the possibilities the future offers and exploring the implications of future 
choices.  Although the assumptions underlying the scenarios developed by various groups 
differ in their specifics, the scenarios emerging from their analysis display remarkable 
continuity.  Two critical uncertainties emerge across all the studies:  To what degree will 
Russia diversify its economy away from reliance on raw materials, particularly oil?  And 
to what degree will Russia liberalize or democratize its political system?2  These two 
questions are actually closely related: because political and economic liberalization tend 
to be highly correlated the answer to the second question will directly influence how the 
former is addressed.  A myriad of scenarios can be developed based on the assumptions 
made with respect to these questions, and the various studies do just that.  Nevertheless, 
at the macro level, three possible outcomes consistently emerge.  1) Russia could pursue 
a path of political and economic liberalization.  2) Russia could attempt to maintain the 
status quo.  3) Russia could become more authoritarian with an economy increasingly 
reliant on state resources.   
These images of the future are consistent with those of Dator’s deductive 
forecasting model, which proposes that virtually all conceivable visions of the future can 
be categorized under one of four images: transformational, continuation, disciplined 
(traditional) society, and decline and collapse.3  Deductive forecasting essentially begins 
with the current state of affairs in a subject area and through reasoned judgment 
                                                 
2  World Economic Forum, Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025, 6. 
3  James A. Dator, "The Futures of Culture or Cultures of the Future," in Perspectives on Cross-
Cultural Psychology, eds. Anthony J. Marsella, Rolad G. Tharp and Thomas J. Ciborowski (New York: 
Academic Press, 1979), 369-388.; Jim Dator, "The Future Lies Behind! Thirty Years of Teaching Future 
Studies," The American Behavioral Scientist 42, no. 3 (Nov/Dec, 1998), 298-319. Dator proposes that 
virtually all conceivable visions of the future can be categorized under one of four images: 
transformational, continuation, disciplined (traditional) society, and decline and collapse.  The decline and 
collapse image is omitted from the present discussion.  Although some thoughtful authors have speculated 
about scenarios under which Russia might experience a decline and collapse due to a major military 
confrontation or ethnically driven dissolution, it is often omitted from do futures research focused on 
Russia.  While it may be argued that this is an unwarranted oversight, for the purposes of the present study 
the omission is justified on the basis that the consequences for agriculture under such a scenario would be 
highly dependent on the circumstances of the collapse and therefore virtually impossible to predict without 
making numerous (invariably tenuous) assumptions.  One notable futures study of Russia that does develop 
a collapse scenario is Center for Global Affairs, Russia 2020 (New York: New York University,[2010]). 
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extrapolates what the future would look like under each of the generic images.  The result 
of these exercises is a set of alternative scenarios depicting what the future may look like. 
A second approach used in futures studies is emerging-issue analysis.  Emerging 
issue analysis begins with the premise that problems develop gradually over time, and are 
often ignored until they reach a point where they demand urgent attention.  If one can 
identify emerging issues at a very early stage—before they become “trends” and before 
they become acute—decision makers may be able to shape the problems while they are 
still malleable, making them easier to solve.  In terms of developing scenarios, emerging-
issue analysis is a useful tool for generating realistic assumptions regarding the trends 
and problems most likely to shape the future.  In practice, scenario developers use a 
combination of these approaches. 
Before introducing the scenarios to be utilized in the present study, a couple of 
observations regarding the nature and limitations of the futures forecasting are in order.  
The first is that because it relies heavily on reasoned judgment in forming conclusions, 
futures studies tends toward the qualitative.  Economic modeling, and other quantitative 
models are certainly utilized in developing the scenarios, however the emphasis is on 
developing a qualitative description of what the future may look like.  Scenarios are 
commonly presented as vignettes depicting the scenario being described as it might 
appear from the perspective of an individual experiencing it.  This facilitates an 
examination of trends likely to shape that future and the impact they may have.  Even 
though the scenarios inevitably err in their particulars, they are valuable as tools for 
envisioning how issues might develop over time.  The simultaneous development of 
several alternate scenarios facilitates the examination of a wider range of trends and 
possibilities. 
Rather than developing original scenarios, the present work adopts three scenarios 
amalgamated from existing sources.  Described in detail below, these three scenarios 
represent the three possible futures that commonly emerge from studies focused on 
Russian development.  
 4 
B. SCENARIO 1: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION 
This scenario assumes that Russia will, over the course of the next decade, 
democratize its political system and implement liberal economic reforms leading to its 
emergence as an influential global player.  Political and economic reform are implicitly 
linked to one another under the assumption that, in the current Russian system, neither is 
likely to occur in the absence of the other.  The World Economic Forum (WEF), in 
developing its version of this scenario, assumes that the failure of the government to 
deliver essential services to the population may drive mass political mobilization 
demanding greater accountability.  Over time, this could lead to a “rebirth” of Russian 
society characterized by a free press, a business climate friendly to private enterprise, and 
a renewed governmental focus on the provision of public goods such as education, 
healthcare, and essential infrastructure.4  The Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies 
(CIFS) assumes that a key element of this scenario may be a virtuous circle wherein 
liberalizing reforms encourage the expansion of small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
driving an increase in median income, diversification of the economy, and the formation 
of a vibrant consumer class.  This consumer class latter becomes an important engine of 
economic growth in its own right, lending popular support to the liberalizing reforms.5  A 
scenario developed in a report for the Finnish parliament joins the WEF in suggesting 
that under such conditions Russia would actively seek closer political and economic ties 
with the European Union (EU) and membership in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).6 
The liberalization scenario supposes political institutions and norms commonly 
championed by the West are adopted in Russia.  These include a free, fair, and open 
electoral process wherein vibrant political parties vie for power in a transparent manner.  
Russia would continue to have a presidential system; however the executive branch 
would be more accountable and responsive to the electorate.  Democratization would 
                                                 
4  World Economic Forum, Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025, 47–59. 
5  Andreasen and Kelstrup, Russian Prospects: Political and Economic Scenarios, 18.  
6  Kuusi et al., Russia 2017: Three Scenarios, 10. 
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help create a participatory political culture, wherein citizens actively participate in civic 
organizations at the grassroots level.7  Economic liberalization would involve adoption of 
reforms supportive of private enterprise.  Chief among these would presumably be 
judicial and legal reforms necessary to institutionalize the rule of law.  This would create 
a more stable business environment by providing a reliable means of enforcing contracts 
and eliminating some of the more arbitrary aspects of governmental regulation.  
Simultaneously, the scenario assumes that anti-corruption initiatives will meet with some 
degree of success.  At the highest levels of government the currently cozy relationship 
between political leaders and big business would become more transparent, and rules 
addressing conflicts of interest would be adopted and enforced.8  At the local level petty 
corruption might persist, but would not present a significant threat to most economic 
interactions. 
Most groups do not explicitly assess the likelihood of the various scenarios they 
develop.  However, in order for a scenario to be most useful as a means of evaluating 
probable impacts and developing potential strategies for mitigation, such an assessment is 
essential.  In an essay prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Vladimir Milov concludes that the liberalization scenario has a low probability of being 
realized because there are few credible motivators to drive genuine change.  Indeed, 
Russia’s response to the economic downturn has not been suggestive of any deep 
reevaluation of the general political and economic strategies pursued during the Putin-
Medvedev Era.  Nevertheless, President Dmitri Medvedev, the junior partner in the ruling 
tandem, has made public statements sympathetic to some liberalizing reforms.  This 
inspires hope that the country may move toward liberalization if he retains meaningful 
influence after Vladimir Putin’s reassumption of the Presidency in 2012.  Overall, the 
likelihood of realizing the liberalization scenario is assessed to be very low (likelihood < 
10 %.)  
                                                 
7  Andreasen and Kelstrup, Russian Prospects: Political and Economic Scenarios, 17. 
8  World Economic Forum, Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025, 52. 
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C. SCENARIO 2: BUSINESS AS USUAL 
Under this scenario, the status quo predominates.  The primary assumption is that 
the political and economic order, championed by Vladimir Putin as the nation regained its 
footing during the 2000s, remains largely intact throughout the coming decade.  The 
ruling elite continue to subordinate economic interests to those of the state while 
eschewing genuine liberal reforms.  Regime legitimacy is based on the provision of a 
minimum standard of living.  Populist measures designed to garner the goodwill of voters 
are a drain on government resources, particularly in the lead up to major elections.  The 
elections themselves are neither fair nor open due to government prohibitions against 
rival political parties and widespread allegations of fraud.  The national economy and 
government revenue are highly dependent on the energy sector.  Although other sectors 
of the economy continue to muddle along, a poor business climate hampers foreign 
investment essential for growth.  This weakness also impedes efforts to bring new oil and 
gas production on line.  As a result, energy exports stagnate or decline modestly.   
Most groups seem to assume that the status quo will not persist in the long term.  
The WEF version of this scenario sees Russia gradually embracing limited economic 
reforms in order to avoid stagnation, but outside the energy sector it remains 
uncompetitive.9  The CIFS report develops two separate status quo scenarios.  One 
similar to the WEF assumes that Russia is willing to allow the energy sector the latitude 
needed to remain competitive internationally.  A second, less benign version assumes that 
the government will exercise a high degree of control over energy production, hampering 
efficiency and preventing the country from benefitting from globalization in a meaningful 
way.10   
The deep recession witnessed in Russia in the face of weak energy demand during 
the 2008 economic downturn highlights its dependence on energy prices.  If oil prices 
remain elevated over the next decade—perhaps $100 per barrel or higher—it would be 
easier for the regime to maintain the status quo, even if overall production does not 
                                                 
9  Ibid. 
10  Andreasen and Kelstrup, Russian Prospects: Political and Economic Scenarios, 23. 
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increase.  If, on the other hand, prices are lower the status quo becomes less tenable.  
Putin, who has voiced only tepid support for the modernization initiatives floated by 
Medvedev, may embody the status quo scenario.  He appears content with the current 
system, championing it as the best guarantor of national ambitions. If world oil prices 
remain elevated by historical standards, that is above $100 per barrel, Russia will have 
the resources to maintain the status quo and the scenario is very likely to occur 
(likelihood > 70%.)  If prices decline, or if Russian oil exports drop precipitously, 
resources will be insufficient and the status quo becomes less tenable (likelihood < 30%.)  
D. SCENARIO 3: THE OIL CURSE 
The oil curse—sometimes called the resource curse or Dutch disease—is based on 
the observation that natural resource windfalls usually fail to deliver sustainable 
economic growth; in fact they often have a deleterious impact on a country’s overall 
prospects.  Five interrelated elements are commonly associated with the oil curse.  First, 
the influx of export earnings from the sale of natural resources often raises the value of 
the country’s currency, thereby harming the competitiveness of non-resource sectors of 
the economy.  In extreme cases, entire industries have been wiped out by the changing 
terms of trade associated with a strong currency.  Second, resource extraction often lends 
itself to a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure.  Lack of competition creates few 
incentives to increase efficiency or follow a prudent capital investment strategy.  As a 
result, the extraction industries themselves tend to be underproductive in their use of 
capital.  Third, the concentration of economic power engendered by these first two 
factors can undermine political institutions, which are liable to be co-opted by rent-
seeking elites.  This fosters a tendency toward autocratic rule.  Fourth, the abundance of 
revenue flowing into government coffers from resource extraction activities relieves the 
state from the necessity of taxing the populace, making it less accountable to citizens.  
Consequently, genuine problems may be ignored so long as they do not directly threaten 
the status quo.  Finally, governments may implicitly assume that the flow of easy money 
will continue indefinitely and neglect investments in future growth.  Not only does this 
hamper development, it also makes the economy extremely vulnerable to a sudden 
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downturn in commodity prices.11  While these five phenomena are readily observable in 
numerous countries around the world, as a politico-economic theorem the oil curse is 
sometimes criticized as overly deterministic.  A few countries have managed to enjoy 
natural resource windfalls while maintaining a balanced economy or successfully 
fostering diversified growth, Norway and the United Arab Emirates being two frequently 
citied examples.   
The first two scenarios (liberalization and status quo) assume that Russia will 
avoid the worst aspects of the oil curse.  In contrast, this scenario assumes that the 
country will become entrapped in all the ills described above.  The economy is 
increasingly dominated by hydrocarbon exports to the detriment of the industrial and 
service sectors.  The manufacturers are unable to produce goods that are competitive in 
global markets.  Protectionist policies attempt to insulate domestic producers from 
competition, and, as a result, globalization fails to take hold in Russia.12  Foreign 
investment and ownership of Russian assets is limited due to poor rule of law and limited 
protection of private property.  The government increasingly becomes the primary source 
for investment capital, which is often wastefully employed, squandered, or embezzled.  
Natural resource revenues relieve pressure on the government to encourage economic 
diversification.  Recognizing the centrality of energy resources to the economy and to 
their own hold on power, the regime tightens its control over natural resources.  
Under this scenario, energy interests dominate the political agenda.  Economic 
elites vie for the favor of the political leaders with power over government policy.  For 
energy industry players, the ability to influence political decisionmaking is more 
important than business acumen.  In response to popular dissatisfaction over bleak 
economic prospects, the regime cracks down heavily on dissent.  Political leaders defend 
the abridgment of political and civil liberties as a necessary expedient to preserve order.  
Rhetoric plays to popular fears of a return to the economic chaos of the 1990s.  The 
regime attempts to maintain legitimacy through appeals to “traditional values and 
                                                 
11  Pratetk Goorha, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse in Russia," Demokratizatsiya 14 
(October, 2006), 602.; World Economic Forum, Russia and the World: Scenarios to 2025, 30. 
12  Ibid. 
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national security.”13  Governmental control over most forms of media hampers the 
dissemination of opposition viewpoints.  Opponents of the regime are subjected to 
official harassment and often forced into exile.  
In assessing the likelihood of this scenario, the central question is, “can Russia 
avoid the oil curse?”  Russia has several advantages working in its favor.  Unlike many 
other major oil exporters, its economy is not monolithic. Russia’s manufacturing, 
agriculture, and service sectors are all sizable in gross terms.  The regime has made a 
considerable effort to maintain a diverse economy, although results have been mixed.14  
Russia also has a highly literate and relatively well-educated workforce.  These factors 
should help Russia avoid the worst aspects of the oil curse so long as the country’s 
political leadership demonstrates a minimal level of competence.  Therefore, the 
likelihood that it will suffer from a serious case of the oil curse is assessed to be low 
(likelihood < 25%.)   
The oil curse scenario could facilitate a return to anti-progressive, authoritarian 
patterns of governance prominent in Russia’s past.  Although oppressive autocracy is 
often associated with the oil curse, the link between the two is not absolute.  The Russian 
population at present may demonstrate a high degree of political apathy and considerable 
tolerance for the some of the authoritarian tendencies evident during the Putin-Medvedev 
era, but it is difficult to imagine that most people would passively countenance a broad 
return to the overtly repressive policies of the past.  A strong move in that direction on 
the part of the regime might reawaken the political activism evidenced two decades ago 
as the Soviet Union disintegrated.  It is unlikely that any regime would be willing to 
chance such a development.  The likelihood that the oil curse would lead to an deeply 
repressive autocratic regime—such as those Russia endured during the Stalin or 
Brezhnev eras—is judged to be remote (likelihood <5%.) 
                                                 
13  Andreasen and Kelstrup, Russian Prospects: Political and Economic Scenarios, 10. 
14  Goorha, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse in Russia, 607–608. 
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II. AGRICULTURE IN RUSSIA 
Most published scenarios for Russia’s future dedicate little effort to a review of 
the recent historical events or current trends informing the projections.  Inasmuch as the 
focus of their work is on future developments and is intended to be general in nature, this 
omission is understandable.  However, it puts the reader into the position of having to 
provide his or her own context on order to evaluate the veracity of the scenarios and their 
conclusions.  Since the present work focuses specifically on the prospects of Russia’s 
agricultural sector, it is appropriate to review the political, economic, and social contexts 
of the rural post-Soviet experience that inform the scenarios.  This historical review will 
draw the reader’s attention to those trends and ideas that have figured prominently over 
the past two decades and to those that are likely to play a meaningful role over the next 
decade.  
A. THE SOVIET LEGACY 
Historically speaking, agrarian reform has been a recurring theme in Russia for 
many generations.  Attempts to modify relationships between peasants, land, and the state 
go back to at least to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when those working the land 
were gradually enserfed by a series of imperial decrees.  The process of eliminating 
serfdom and managing the accompanying reordering of land ownership took place over 
more than fifty years, and in some respects was still ongoing when the tsarist regime 
collapsed.  Communist leaders took up the banner of reform again when they imposed 
forced collectivization during the 1930s.  The end of Soviet rule in 1991 and the attendant 
collapse of the collective farm system forced Russia to once again address this perennial 
issue.  
The collectivized system created two intertwining problems, which all subsequent 
reform measures have been forced to contend with.  The first is an impaired and 
underproductive labor force often resistant to new ideas.  The second is a plethora of 
misaligned or inefficient incentives that prevent agricultural enterprises from realizing 
their productive potential.  These twin legacies continue to exert profound influence 
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throughout the agricultural sector and will continue influence policy debates over the next 
decade.  Together, they provide essential context for evaluating the current state and 
future prospects of Russian agriculture as a whole.  
The roots of both issues can be traced back to the initial collectivization drive 
executed under Josef Stalin in the 1930s.  The campaign was an essential element in the 
relentless industrialization drive that defined the era.  At the time, party intellectuals 
successfully argued that the agricultural sector could finance industrial development if a 
means could be devised to unlock the capital tied up in the countryside.  Collectivization 
served this end.  Once imposed, it allowed the regime to impose rock bottom 
procurement prices for agricultural goods while maximizing the prices of consumer and 
industrial goods.  The difference flowed into government coffers.15  Collectivization 
succeeded in accomplishing its immediate goal; industrialization proceeded at a 
breakneck pace and was a critical enabler of victory during World War II.   
But this success was dearly purchased.  First and foremost, industrialization 
imposed mass misery and suffering on the population, both urban and rural.16  The long-
term costs included the two issues presently under consideration.  Collectivization created 
a continuing, inexorable drain of human capital from rural areas and encouraged 
chronically poor resource allocation decisions by both the government and rural laborers.  
Conditions in the village and demand for labor in the rapidly expanding cities guaranteed 
that the out-migration would continue.  Because young people left in greater numbers 
than the elderly, the vitality of many villages dropped, leaving a demoralized cadre 
disproportionately comprised of the elderly and those whose circumstances or lack of 
initiative prevented them from seeking new opportunities elsewhere.  This led one rural 
official in 1937 to provide this blunt assessment: “The clever ones left the collective 
farms long ago; all that remain are the fools.”17  Although the 1930s saw the most 
dramatic exodus in terms of overall numbers, the talent drain from the village continued 
                                                 
15  Alec Nove, An Economic History of the U.S.S.R (London: Allen Lane, 1969), 210–211. 
16  Nove provides telling statistical evidence highlighting industrialization’s impact. Ibid., 207. 
17  Robert W. Strayer, Why did the Soviet Union Collapse?  Understanding Historical Change (New 
York: M. E. Sharp, 1998), 42. 
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throughout the Soviet period.  Conditions in the city were consistently perceived to be 
much better than on the collective farm due to the higher wages, the possibilities for 
education, and the improved opportunities for upward mobility.18 
Perhaps most noteworthy in light of Russia’s post-Soviet troubles is the 
dependent, lethargic mentality collectivization engendered.  Historian Sheila Fitzpatrick 
succinctly summarizes the rural dynamic: 
In their approach to work on the kolkhoz, peasants displayed many of the 
characteristics of unfree labor.  They worked poorly and unwillingly… 
were likely to start work only when the brigade leader told them to and 
continue only as long as he watched them.  They pilfered anything they 
could from the kolkhoz, implicitly rejecting the idea that collective 
property was in any sense theirs rather than the state’s.  They avoided 
direct confrontation with their masters but used cunning, deception, and 
assumed stupidity to avoid obeying instructions.  They often displayed 
what baffled officials described as a “dependent psychology” 
(izhdivencheskie nastroeniia), working only when they were given explicit 
instructions and expecting the authorities to give them handouts when 
times were hard.19 
As we will see, many of these attitudes continue to be prevalent in Russian villages today 
and continue to greatly complicate reform efforts. 
Like virtually all aspects of the centrally planned economy, collectivized farming 
proved to be inefficient in a multitude of ways.  Reform campaigns carried out after 
Stalin’s death could do little to correct the underlying weaknesses, which were structural 
in nature.  These weaknesses began with the system’s inability to effectively incentivize 
production.  The individual peasant had little interest in the success or failure of the 
kolkhoz because extra production benefited him little, if at all.20  The subsistence 
conditions under which farm workers labored demonstrated that there was little hope of 
benefiting from a successful harvest since the party-state would presumably extort any 
excess.  The peasantry’s lack of internal motivation meant that continued productivity 
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19  Ibid., 129. 
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could only be maintained if authorities consistently imposed external motivation in the 
form of coercion and repression.  This was done repeatedly under Stalin, the terror 
famine of 1932–33 being only the most prominent example.  But coercion was costly 
both economically and politically.  In any case, terror could only compel the individual 
peasant to do the bare minimum required to escape punishment.  It never inspired him to 
produce a surplus.  Given this dynamic, it is not surprising that in later years when the 
regime was less willing to impose harsh suffering on the rural population, Soviet 
agriculture was chronically incapable of feeding the nation. 
Eventually, significant differences developed between the real costs of 
agricultural production and the value of goods produced.  In the command system 
political will was a primary determinant in the resource allocation process.  However, the 
centralized planning system could not properly count the true economic costs of favored 
projects.  The case of Soviet beef production provides an instructive example.  In the 
1960s political leadership decided that the nation should strive to be the equal of the West 
in the production of meat and milk.  For geographic reasons, maintaining cattle in Russia 
is much more expensive and capital intensive than in other parts of the world.  The 
shorter summers mean that cattle spend a smaller portion of the year grazing and a larger 
portion consuming costly feed.  Longer, colder winters also require large, heated sheds to 
shelter the animals.21  Thus, the marginal cost of raising beef production in the Soviet 
Union was higher than in the milder climates of the Western nations, which communist 
leaders were comparing their country with.22  Such realities did not deter Soviet leaders 
and planners.  While the Soviet Union never achieved full parity with the United States in 
terms of beef production or consumption, it still became the world’s second largest beef 
producer, accounting for 18% of the world total.23  But the cost of achieving this was 
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exorbitant.  The increased demand for feed grain necessary to maintain the vest herds 
exceeded what the inefficient domestic farms could produce.  As a result, the Soviet 
Union became the world’s most prominent grain importer during the 1970s.  Had it not 
been for the uneconomical drive for meat parity, Soviet grain supplies would likely have 
been sufficient to meet domestic needs without resorting to imports.  Indeed, the 
cessation of grain imports since 1991 is largely attributable to a dramatic reduction in 
herd size to more rational levels.24  
Even though collectivization of agriculture was the key to funding 
industrialization, over time agriculture demanded an increasing share of the regime’s 
investment resources until it eventually consumed one quarter of the budget.  High 
investment levels did boost overall production, but not enough to prevent recurring crises 
in the sector.  As a World Bank assessment concluded, “In Soviet times, production was 
high, mainly because it was heavily subsidized, not because it was efficient.”25  By the 
time Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, it was clear that the system was broken.  The 
most frequently cited example of the failure is the production comparison between 
collectivized farms and individual peasants working private plots of land.  The regime 
allowed peasants to keep small plots—about an acre or so in size—to grow their own 
crops or maintain an animal or two.  Production from these plots that was not consumed 
directly by the peasants could be sold at farmer’s markets.  Given the low wages paid to 
kolkhozniki, these plots became essential to survival in rural areas.26  Ronald Reagan 
famously highlighted this point in a 1982 speech observing; “private plots occupy a bare 
three percent of [the Soviet Union’s] arable land but account for nearly one-quarter of 
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Soviet farm output and nearly one-third of meat products and vegetables.”27 
In summarizing the legacy bequeathed by Soviet agriculture to its Russian 
successor, three central points deserve emphasis.  First, collectivization decimated the 
peasantry by eliminating its most productive members and forcing the survivors to scrape 
by at a subsistence level.  The enormous human costs associated with these conditions 
resulted in a demoralized, underproductive rural populace.  Second, centralized planning 
eliminated the need for agricultural concerns to produce on a profit-making basis.  As a 
result, the agricultural sector was systematically incapable of responding to market 
dynamics once the Soviet system collapsed.  Lastly, as inefficient as collectivized farms 
were at the end of the Soviet era, they were still indispensable to both large-scale 
cultivation and the productivity of individual plots. 
B. THE ARC OF AGRARIAN REFORM 
After the Soviet Union collapsed the entire economy was plunged into a radically 
different environment where the terms of production were determined by economic 
forces rather than political fiat.  Throughout the post-Soviet period, reform efforts have 
focused heavily on rationalizing production incentives in order to overcome the 
inefficiencies of the collectivized system.  Policy has largely ignored the human capital 
problem, perhaps because it is not widely understood outside domestic circles and is not 
easily addressed through governmental policy.  Whatever the cause, it is clear that the 
failure of reformers to meaningfully address rural labor impairments has adversely 
impacted the reform process, preventing Russia from fully recognizing the benefits of 
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liberalization.  
William Liefert and Johan Swinnen have identified four key elements that 
agricultural reforms sought to address in post-communist states: market liberalization, 
farm restructuring, reform of upstream and downstream operations and the creation of 
supporting market infrastructure.28  It should be noted that these four areas are by no 
means mutually exclusive.  In fact, they are closely related to one another.  Failure or 
weakness in one usually bleeds over to the others.  Similarly, success in one area 
frequently—but not always—contributes to progress in the others.  A World Bank 
analysis suggests that the countries that have most effectively carried out reforms across 
these areas have had the best outcomes in terms of recovering agricultural productivity 
and prosperity.29  This section will utilize the Liefert-Swinnen elements as a framework 
to review Russia’s initiatives and performance, examining each in turn. 
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Figure 1.   Four Elements of Agricultural Reform in Transitional Economies (From 
Liefert, 2002) 
1. Market Liberalization 
As in other post-communist nations, the liberalization of agricultural markets in 
Russia has usually been directly related to the removal of government controls over the 
allocation of resources and outputs.  Most commonly, these controls involve subsidies 
employed at several stages of production.  As these subsidies are removed, domestic 
production is forced to compete on a more equal basis with imported goods.  As this 
occurs, the production of goods that cannot be competitively produced without subsidies 
can be expected to decline.  Simultaneously, newfound access to additional markets 
should encourage an expansion of activity in those areas where domestic farmers have a 
comparative advantage.  In an ideal situation, these dynamics would force all actors in the 
sector to become more efficient in order to survive.  In other words, Schumpeter’s 
creative destruction is given free reign to eliminate the least efficient producers and 
reward competitive enterprises.  Predictably, as these processes occur, they drive changes 
in the mix of goods produced.  The decline of Russian beef production since the demise 
of the Soviet Union alluded to previously is an instructive example.  Once government 
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support was reduced and producers had to bear the full costs of production, many 
enterprises were no longer competitive.  Thus, the number of cattle in Russia declined 
60% between 1990 and 2002 and is unlikely to ever rebound to Soviet-era levels.30  
While there is little doubt such creative destruction can be good for long-term prosperity, 
the short-term impacts and dislocations can be wrenching.  Managing them is an 
important aspect of reform policy.  Unfortunately, in the case of Russia, producers were 
slow to find comparative advantages and slow to adapt to market conditions.  
Significantly, political leaders were loathe to see existing farms fail entirely and 
frequently intervened to save them for reasons to be explored momentarily.  
To a certain extent, market liberalization in Russia occurred as a matter of course 
when the government found itself financially incapable of maintaining Soviet era 
policies.  Yet it also reflected a deliberate choice on the part of the Yeltsin government to 
reject incremental measures in favor of a drastic realignment toward free markets.  This 
approach came to be known as “shock therapy” and was pursued in several Eastern 
European nations with varying degrees of success.  As applied to the agricultural sector, 
Stephen Wegren has described the Russian variant of shock therapy as “state 
withdrawal,” reflecting the fact that during the 1990s the federal government’s role in the 
agricultural sector shrank dramatically.31  Reduction or elimination of many subsidies 
resulted in enormous food price inflation for consumers.  At the same time, producers did 
not benefit from higher prices because they faced even greater increases in their own 
production costs due to the loss of subsidized inputs such as fuel, farm equipment, seed, 
and fertilizer.  This phenomenon, in which production costs are higher than retail prices, 
is commonly referred to as the “price scissors.”32  The majority of Russian farms 
discovered that they had great difficulty competing with low cost imports from abroad. 
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The net effect of market liberalization was a precipitous decline in production across all 
sectors of the agrarian economy, the magnitude of which far exceeded the predictions of 
Western analysts.33   
Following the 1998 financial collapse, a consensus developed among 
policymakers that the laissez faire approach was not working for Russia, and that 
increased state intervention in the economy was needed.34  This paradigm shift would be 
felt across all four aspects of reform policy.  Indeed, the entire agrarian reform narrative 
shifts dramatically after 1999, reflecting the belief that the state should have a more 
active presence in the agricultural sector.  The result has been a mix of free market policy 
and government intervention to support producers of specific goods while expanding 
overall productivity.  In principle, the approach is similar to that of other developed 
countries, including the United States.  Policies became more assertive in protecting 
domestic producers from some of the market’s more deleterious effects.  This is a trend 
that has continued to the present.  Specific measures employed include import quotas that 
limit competition from foreign goods, export bans intended to insulate consumers from 
rising world prices, and continuing subsidies in the form of loans, credits, restructuring or 
forgiveness of debt, and subsidized crop insurance.  These measures have largely been 
anti-market in nature, although some market levers, such as open market purchases to 
support price floors, have been utilized.35   
The term “food security” has become a buzzword among politicians contending 
that Russia should maintain the ability to meet its own needs.36  It is under this guise that 
many initiatives in support of agriculture are carried out.  In 2010 President Dmitri 
Medvedev approved the Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation.  This 
document sets ambitious self-sufficiency goals, some of which are unlikely to be realized 
in the absence of further state intervention.  The goal of 85% self-sufficiency in meat and 
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meat products is notable in this respect.37 
The formation of the United Grain Company (UGC) in 2009 as a state distribution 
and trading company has also been viewed with suspicion by some observers who fear it 
is an attempt to monopolize Russian grain exports, influence global prices, and assert 
primacy over the domestic market.  A World Bank analysis suggests that based on the 
experience of state grain enterprises in other nations if Russia does harbor such ambitions 
they are unlikely to be realized.38  Other views characterize the UGC as a step toward 
renationalization of the agro-industrial sector, reflecting trends toward greater state 
control seen in other sectors of the Russian economy.  However, formation of the UGC 
can also be viewed in a less threatening light as a mechanism to promote orderly trading 
and improve distribution and export infrastructure.  This is the vision promoted by the 
ministry of agriculture and President Medvedev.39  The extent to which food security 
policies or the UGC will actually change Russia’s market oriented policies is unclear.  Do 
they represent an attempt by the government to subvert market activity, or are they 
intended to improve market efficiency?  As is often the case, the motivations of Russian 
political leaders are opaque.  The fact that the approved Food Security Doctrine did not 
contain the strong protectionist language of earlier drafts championed by the Agricultural 
Ministry indicates that pro-market approaches retain political support.  Furthermore, the 
doctrine does not carry the force of law, nor does it define how objectives should be met, 
leaving policymakers with plenty of room to maneuver.40 
                                                 
37  Yelena Vassilieva and Mary Ellen Smith, Food Security Doctrine Adopted, GAIN Report Number: 
RS1008 (Washington, DC: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service,[2010]). 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Food%20Security%20Doctrine%20Adopted%2
0_Moscow_Russian%20Federation_2-11-2010.pdf. 
38  World Bank, A State Trading Enterprise for Grains in Russia?  Issues and Options, Report no. 
45925 - RU (Washington, DC: The World Bank,[2009]). 
39  Yelena Vassilieva, Russia's Federal United Grain Company Created, GAIN Report no. RS9022 
(Washington, DC: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service,[2009]). 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200903/146347621.pdf. 
40  Yelena Vassilieva and Mary Ellen Smith, Russian Federation Agricultural Situation, GAIN Report 
Number: RS8089 (Washington, DC: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service,[2008]). 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200811/146306496.pdf. 
 22 
Another issue with potential to affect the course of market liberalization is 
Russia’s proposed accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Within the 
Russian government, the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Industry 
have actively pressed for WTO membership for several years, while the Ministry of 
Agriculture has steadily opposed it.  A major sticking point in negotiations has been 
Russia’s agricultural supports.  Recent reports assert that Russia is prepared to cut 
agricultural subsidies in half in order to gain membership.41  This suggests that if and 
when Russia does join the WTO, the impacts on agriculture will likely include increased 
competition from imports.  This is a source of concern for farmers, who fear that, given 
Russia’s cold climate, it will be impossible for them to produce as cheaply as competitors 
in warmer areas.  As one farmer emotionally exclaimed to a reporter, “If we enter the 
WTO, my company will shut down!  Because my potato will always cost twice as much 
as theirs because they harvest it three times a year, and I do only once!”42  A more 
sanguine view suggests that, over time, increased competition may actually act as a boon 
to production by forcing farmers to concentrate on products where they enjoy competitive 
advantages.  At present, there are still far more questions than answers when it comes to 
Russia and the WTO. 
2. Farm Restructuring 
The failure to overhaul the inefficient collective farm system in the 1990s was a 
significant contributor to the painful dislocations caused by market liberalization.  This 
failure was not explicitly due to any affection on the part of policymakers toward the old 
system, but rather a failure to build institutions to replace collective farms and a failure to 
create conditions favorable for alternative systems of farming to arise.  Russia’s early 
farm restructuring efforts revolved around privatization.  While reformers themselves 
appear not to have had a well-formed vision of their desired end state, they generally 
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attempted to privatize the land in such a way as to encourage individual or household 
farming.  This approach made intuitive sense because on the surface the most efficient 
agricultural units in the Soviet system were the private plots.  However, by the end of the 
1990s, it was clear that most of these plots were oriented toward subsistence agriculture 
and did not contribute significantly to overall production.  Collective farms, nominally 
independent of direct government control, but largely unreformed, continued to be the 
dominant producers in spite of their chronic weakness.  Meaningful restructuring began 
to occur only after the 1998 financial crisis prompted changes to the government’s 
philosophy toward intervention in the economy.  Under Putin, the government has 
displayed a greater willingness to protect domestic producers than during the Yeltsin era, 
and rising oil prices have provided the financial resources needed to address problems.  
Perhaps more significantly, legislation clarifying land rights has encouraged private 
investment in agricultural companies.  Over the last five years, this has facilitated more 
substantive restructuring of farm enterprises, engendering hope that, after years of 
incremental progress, Russia may finally be poised to set aside some of the legacies of 
collectivized farming. 
Several factors combine to explain the slow pace of farm restructuring.  First, 
meaningful farm restructuring required the development of private land rights, which had 
not existed under the communist regime.  The 1992 land code took the first step forward 
by enshrining the principle of private land ownership.  It distributed the lands belonging 
to collective farms to individuals employed by the farm.  The farms themselves were 
reorganized as joint stock companies.  Villagers were also given ownership of the private 
plots they had maintained under the old regime.  It was hoped that these steps would 
encourage the rise of a class of private household farmers.  However, while it was 
possible to convert the land shares into physical plots of land, few individuals elected to 
do so and the value of these shares has remained ambiguous.  More broadly, a lack of 
enabling legislation (perhaps stemming from a lack of social consensus on the nature of 
property rights) prevented uniform implementation of the code across regions.  This 
created widespread uncertainty regarding property rights, particularly relating to 
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agricultural land.43  Predictably given the uncertainty, private investment was scarce and 
few new operators took possession of the lands worked by legacy farms.  As a result, the 
status quo was maintained by default.  The now-independent collective farms continued 
to hold most of the land, but struggled to work it effectively with the drastically reduced 
levels of state support.   
This situation persisted for nearly a decade until further legislation enacted in 
2001 began to improve matters by more clearly defining property rights and transfer 
rules.  Subsequent laws defining the specific rules pertaining to agricultural land 
encouraged outside investors to explore opportunities in rural areas.  Laws allowing for 
foreign ownership of agricultural land in the mid-2000s encouraged a dramatic expansion 
of foreign direct investment in the sector.  By 2008, a “land rush” developed, with large-
scale operators scrambling to secure access to the best fields.  Land prices increased 
dramatically.44  At present, the majority of landownership continues to be in the form of 
individual land shares leased by villagers back to the independent collective farm.  But 
increasingly, private companies are purchasing these shares, undermining or eliminating 
independent collective farms in the process.45  Still, these positive trends belie the fact 
that bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and high administrative fees continue to 
complicate and impede private land transfers.  Indeed, these factors place individual 
villagers at a distinct disadvantage in comparison with well-financed corporate operators 
in terms of exercising property rights and benefitting from emerging private property 
markets.  
A second frequently cited explanation for the slow pace of restructuring is a 
purported social preference for collective forms of agricultural work in rural Russia.  
Beginning with the Gorbachev reforms of the 1980s, agrarian reform in Russia has not 
arisen spontaneously as a result of popular pressure.  Instead, leaders at the top have 
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imposed it on the populace.  Therefore, reform has often failed to embody any form of 
social consensus as to what should be done.  There is strong evidence to suggest that 
most villagers are not particularly inclined toward individual or family farming.  Russia 
has a cultural tradition of communal land tenure.  For centuries, agricultural land has 
been apportioned and administered through local institutions.  This was a primary 
function of the mir in imperial times.  The kolkhoz inherited this function with the added 
feature of jointly working the land.  A survey of agricultural experts conducted in 1999 
showed only 12% of respondents expressing hope that household farming would become 
dominant.  The overwhelming majority favored some form of communal farming.46  The 
attachment to collective farms is also conditioned by the fact that in many villages the 
farm is not only the primary employer; it is also the sole provider of public services such 
as health care and education.  In fact, this social services role was expanded in the 1990s 
when the Yeltsin government made the beleaguered operators responsible for maintaining 
rural infrastructure as well.   
Recently, Jessica Allina-Pisano has raised the controversial notion that rural farm 
restructuring has been intentionally stunted by rural elites who exploited the prevailing 
collective mentality in an explicit attempt to derail rural land reform efforts.47  While 
there is anecdotal evidence to support the notion that this may have occurred in isolated 
instances, there is little to suggest that rural elites, such as they are, have the capacity or 
the desire to systematically undermine central government initiatives in favor of the 
status quo.48  The actions of farm managers, local government officials, and regional 
administrators are more easily explained by the mundane exigencies of survival and 
preserving order, rather than any pervasive conspiracy. 
The most significant economic factor in the failure of individual and household 
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farms to thrive has been a lack of access to resources.  While large in number, individual 
farms tend to be very small in size and are oriented toward subsistence agriculture.  They 
lack access to equipment and sources of credit available to large producers, and are often 
heavily reliant on the local collective farms for access to inputs.  One field study in the 
Belgorod oblast, found that nearly half of the fodder used by individual household farms 
originated with the local collective farm, and there was evidence that the other half may 
have come from the same source via informal channels.  This led the researchers to 
conclude that, “No Russian peasant farmstead would survive a day without the collective 
farm.”49   
The nature of this codependent relationship between the peasantry and the 
independent collective farm helps to explain the latter’s survival even in cases of obvious 
insolvency.50  When government support was withdrawn in the early 1990s, the old farm 
management cadre generally lacked the business acumen necessary to adapt to new 
realities.  Even when they were able to successfully identify needed changes, they lacked 
the resources to implement them.  The government’s de facto withdrawal from the 
agricultural sector and the absence of private sources of capital meant that upgrading 
equipment, shifting production patterns, or pursuing other opportunities for growth was 
simply out of the question.  Thus, the independent collective farms were consigned to 
continue operations along the same lines as during the Soviet era.  They became 
chronically unprofitable, failed to pay wages to their members, failed to repay 
government credits extended to replenish working capital, and were frequently forced to 
dump farm products at below-market prices in order to obtain needed cash.51   
In a true market economy with hard budget constraints, such inefficient 
enterprises would fail via bankruptcy.  However, in Russia, government leaders were 
unwilling to countenance such an outcome.  There no viable, alternative producers ready 
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to step in to work the land.  Moreover, as noted above, the independent collective farms 
continued to be essential to individual survival in many villages.  In order to avert 
collapse, federal and regional governments chose to extend a variety of farm credits.  
When these loans went unpaid, they would be forgiven, effectively transforming the 
credits into a form of subsidy.  As one group of researchers observes, this pattern harkens 
back to Soviet era practices, where farm managers enjoyed soft budgets and could rely on 
the government to cover losses.52   
Given these realities, it is not surprising that the farms’ capacity to work the land 
slowly atrophied.  In aggregate terms, the amount of land under cultivation decreased by 
at least 25 million hectares.53  Some of this contraction can be viewed as a correction 
from the Soviet era when agricultural policies championing expansion in breadth 
encouraged production on marginal lands.  Some of the contraction reflects Russia’s 
declining rural demographics.  Nevertheless, the fact that widespread abandonment 
occurred even in the most fertile regions indicates that the weakness of the collective 
farms was a major factor.  The scope of the phenomenon has led geographer Grigory 
Ioffe to suggest that in the future Russian agricultural production will increasingly 
resemble an archipelago, with islands of productive lands in Central and Southern Russia 
surrounded by vast swaths of abandoned fields.54  The federal government has signaled 
its concern over this prospect.  In January 2011, President Dmitri Medvedev announced 
an initiative to seize agricultural lands if the owners failed to cultivate them for three 
consecutive years.55  Whether such measures can reverse the trend remains an open 
question.   
While much of the agricultural sector floundered in the 1990s, there was one 
segment that was somewhat healthier.  As a group, food processors became profitable by 
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the mid-1990s.  However, the weakness of the independent collective farms threatened 
these companies’ access to the quality farm products essential to their operations.  In an 
attempt to remedy this situation, food processors began to acquire ownership stakes in 
farm operations or even purchase farms outright.  Such actions were encouraged by 
government officials eager to ensure the farms’ survival.56  This gave rise to vertically 
integrated agribusiness firms.  These combined enterprises enjoyed the access to capital 
markets and financing needed to modernize farm operations.   
Initially, the farms themselves were usually an unprofitable part of the combined 
business.  Some observers noted a tendency for the new corporate owners or investors 
(sometimes referred to as agro-holding companies) to exploit the land for maximum 
short-term production with little concern for the long-term consequences.  This led one 
Russian analyst to compare the corporate farm operators of the early 2000s with the 
operators of bonanza farms in North Dakota during the late nineteenth century.57  
Nevertheless, as conditions continued to improve and the government signaled increased 
support for the agricultural sector, corporate farming emerged as a productive and 
profitable farming arrangement, economically superior in most respects to the 
independent collective farms.  Naturally, success encouraged additional investors to rush 
in.  Many of them had few ties to the Russian countryside, which meant that they were 
not wedded to existing structures, institutions, and practices.  Perhaps most significantly, 
these large corporate operators often brought political connections and were able to lobby 
the government on agricultural policies to a much greater extent than the enfeebled 
independent collective farms.  Quantifying the scope of this expansion is challenging due 
to the paucity of statistics on the subject, but one analysis suggests that in 2009, corporate 
farms accounted for more than 12% of the land under cultivation.  In the most productive 
farming regions the percentage is probably even higher.58  This small, but rapidly 
expanding presence has also encouraged the independent collective farms to improve 
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their own operations in order to avoid being replaced, keying a recent agricultural 
resurgence.  According to government figures, the overall value of the nation’s 
production increased 49% between 2006 and 2009.59  The importance of this production 
to international grain markets was illustrated in 2010 when a poor harvest in Russia was a 
major contributor to record high food prices.  Overall, farming has become profitable, 
with over 70% of operators reporting profits in 2007 compared with just over 10% in 
1998.60  Corporate farming’s share of land and production will likely to continue to grow 
as additional collective farms are displaced. 
3. Reform of Upstream and Downstream Operations  
The third element of agricultural reform Russia had to address is a group of 
factors collectively referred to as upstream and downstream operations.  Upstream 
operations involve supplying farms with agricultural inputs.  Downstream operations 
involve the elements needed to bring production to market, including storage, 
transportation, and distribution networks.  When subsidies for upstream inputs such as 
fuel, fertilizer, equipment, and other working capital were taken away during the period 
of state withdrawal, farms were forced to procure these items at much higher market 
prices.  This raised production costs dramatically.  The inability to effectively cope with 
the new liberalized market dynamics inspired a vicious circle in which unprofitable farms 
were unable to repay loans and subsequently could not obtain additional credit to 
replenish their working capital for the next growing season.  The farms found themselves 
unable to sow all their fields or maintain the size of their herds, further undermining 
hopes of profitability.  As indicated in the previous section, when farms reached the brink 
of insolvency, the government (often at the regional level) would frequently intervene 
and avert collapse by providing credits for the purchase of inputs or forgiving debt.61  
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But such intervention was uneven and, given the scope of the problem and the 
government’s own budgetary woes, generally inadequate to the task.   
Entrepreneurial traders recognized opportunity amid the chaos.  Individuals in a 
position to lend money to the independent collective farms would agree to provide the 
farm with essential inputs at planting time in exchange for a share of the crop at 
predetermined prices.  In advanced countries futures contracts traded on established 
markets perform this function.  Unfortunately, this “market” for future production was 
primitive and inefficient.  The farms, lacking alternative sources of credit, often had little 
leverage when negotiating terms.  A lack of access to market information also put them at 
a disadvantage.  As a result, the prices traders paid were often only slightly above actual 
production costs.  When grain prices rose in 2001 and 2002, these traders were among 
those who profited most since they were able to sell the contracted grain on the open 
market at a tremendous mark up.62  Given the cultural distaste in Russia for middlemen 
and their perceived profiteering, it is not surprising that the traders were often viewed 
with resentment.  However, the fact that these traders could make handsome profits was 
apparently not lost on investors, who were entering the sector in increasing numbers. 
A key success of recent reform efforts has been to increase in the availability of 
seasonal credit essential to successful farming operations.  The Ministry of Agriculture 
has assumed a leading role in facilitating this credit by either direct lending or through 
subsidized commercial loans.  For the spring 2011 planting season, government loans are 
anticipated to represent approximately one-third of seasonal lending, with the balance 
coming from state owned commercial banks.  The ministry also provides assistance in 
procuring inputs including fuels and fertilizer.63  The heavy government role has made 
resources available for most farms, correcting one of the most serious problems of the 
1990s.  However, farm managers indicate that bureaucratic obstacles and the sometimes-
arbitrary nature of Russian governance now represent an additional challenge.  As one 
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manager recently complained to a reporter, “I’m not a revolutionary, I’m a professional… 
we need clear rules of the game if we are to succeed.”64  Another foreign farm investor 
points out that in Russia he must employ twenty accountants and lawyers to handle 
administrative issues, compared with only one bookkeeper on his farm in the United 
Kingdom.65  Such anecdotes are once again suggestive of not only the need for further 
reform, but also the advantages large corporate operators who can afford to employ such 
a cadre of professionals enjoy over household farms and small producers.  Although the 
agricultural ministry has signaled a desire to reduce its role in providing access to inputs, 
private lenders have so far been reticent to enter the realm of agricultural finance.  Until 
this occurs it is unlikely that the government’s role will be reduced.  
Turning to the downstream operations, Russia’s storage and distribution 
infrastructure is still in poor condition and in some ways has been touched the least by 
reform measures.  To begin with, Russian farms generally lack sufficient on site storage 
capacity.  This means they are obliged to send their crops to market as they are harvested, 
regardless of market conditions.  One of the significant advantages agro-holding 
companies have over other producers is the financial wherewithal to invest in such 
facilities.  This provides them the flexibility to hold on to goods in a weak market until 
prices improve.  For example, in 2010 when the poor harvest and a government-imposed 
export ban caused uncertainty in the markets, Agro-Vista, a large operator in the Tambov 
region, was able to store and hold a portion of its fall grain harvest in the expectation that 
prices would be higher later in the year.  The farm’s manager stated that even though the 
harvest was meager, he anticipated that the enterprise would still make a profit due to the 
higher prices he would eventually receive using this strategy.66  The Ministry of 
Agriculture has taken steps to expand the availability of medium- and long-term loans to 
fund such capital improvements.  However, persistently high debt levels due to years of 
unprofitability prevent many farms from taking advantage.  
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The other formidable downstream challenge in Russia is the poor transportation 
and distribution network.  Geographically, the country’s vast size means crops often have 
to travel significant distances to market.  This results in an additional cost burden, 
especially to producers located far from population centers and transportation nodes.  
This is one reason that the agricultural areas exhibiting the strongest recoveries are in the 
vicinity of Moscow (a population center and major consumer) and in the Southern Black 
Earth regions (near grain export facilities in the Black Sea.)  The distance problem is only 
exacerbated by the poor condition of the transportation network.  Roads are of poor 
quality and suffer from years of neglect.  During good harvests the rail network strains to 
keep up with demand, a condition that may grow worse in coming years.  Rail officials 
have stated that as much as 57% of their grain transport fleet will need to be replaced 
within the next five years.  Likewise, the capacity of grain export facilities will need to 
expand by 50% over the next decade if Russia is to become the world’s foremost 
exporter, as some analysts project.67  There is hope that the recent profitability of 
agriculture will facilitate needed capital investments.  Indeed, one of the advertized 
benefits stemming from the formation of the United Grain Company is increased 
government investment in grain elevators and export facilities.68  
4. Creation of Supporting Market Infrastructure 
In order to function properly, a free market system requires both institutions 
supportive of private enterprise and a transparent, predictable governance environment.  
Several elements that contribute to this infrastructure including land reform, development 
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of private property rights, and agricultural banking and finance have already been 
considered in connection with other reform areas.  Additional elements include channels 
for the distribution of market information, a stable regulatory environment, and fostering 
a favorable business environment that includes mechanisms for enforcing contracts.  As 
Liefert and Swinnen acknowledge, it can be difficult to separate the reform of upstream 
and downstream operations from reforms that support market infrastructure because the 
two are often interrelated.69  In Russia this is certainly the case.  Much of the supporting 
market infrastructure created over the past twenty years was developed in response to the 
difficulties farms experienced procuring inputs.   
Like other free enterprise activities, a market oriented agricultural system 
functions best when supported by credible governing institutions.  Unfortunately, over 
the last decade Russia has systematically failed to progress in this area and by some 
measures has actually gone backward.  Accounts of corruption, bribery, and favoritism 
are widespread.  Because Russia has failed to establish a credible regime to enforce 
contract law, businesses operating in Russia must be extremely wary in dealing with 
counterparties.  Political connections and bribery allegedly play a far greater role in 
determining the outcome of disputes than the actual rights or wrongs of the specific case.  
Such uncertainties can prevent owners from making prudent long-term investments.  The 
persistence of the infrastructure problems discussed above —especially the inadequacy of 
storage and distribution facilities—is also related to this hesitancy to invest for the long-
term.  While Russian leaders continue to promote their country as a favorable for 
investment, there remains a lingering fear that a weak tradition of personal property rights 
and the government’s propensity to assert its own interests over that of private owners 
make farming in Russia a risky venture.70  
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C. THE RURAL LABOR FORCE 
The reform policies discussed and critiqued above focus heavily on the systemic 
aspects of agricultural production.  Clearly they were both essential and necessary to the 
transition from communism to a market oriented system.  However, they have notably 
failed to address many of the social and human capital problems collectivization created.  
Most technical analyses of Russian agriculture ignore this issue entirely or provide only 
summary treatment.  By contrast, in field studies the social problems and impairments of 
the rural labor force are usually a salient feature.  Indeed, without referencing conditions 
in Russian villages today it is impossible to draw a complete picture of the Russian 
agricultural sector, nor to accurately assess its future prospects.  This concluding section 
will discuss these societal factors and their impact on both reform policy and agriculture 
as a whole.   
1. The Social Legacy of Collectivization Today  
Clearly, collectivization was the pervasive backdrop against which agrarian 
reform took place and virtually all reform efforts were aimed at remedying the 
deficiencies it engendered.  But as catastrophic as collectivization was economically its 
most damaging aspects were the human costs imposed on the rural populace.  An 
accurate assessment of the continuing impact today requires some historical perspective.  
Within Russian society rural peasants have always been marginalized.  Although they 
constituted the vast majority of the Russian population until the middle of the twentieth 
century, they have consistently been forcibly bound to the land in varying degrees of 
serfdom.  In Imperial Russia, the small class of Westernized aristocrats and the 
intelligentsia often regarded peasants by as backward or even degenerate.  Certainly, 
Vladimir Lenin and other prominent Bolsheviks, who were primarily from urban 
intellectual backgrounds, held such views.71  Western visitors to Russia often echoed 
similar sentiments, writing about the peasantry’s backward nature and propensity toward 
drunkenness.  An English engineer named John Perry, who spent 14 years in Russia 
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during the reign of Peter the Great, concluded that social conditions made Russian 
peasants “the most dull and heavy people to attain to any art or science… apt to rebel and 
engage in the most barbarous cruelties, in hopes of being relieved from that slavery that is 
hereditary to them.”72  Another eighteenth century English traveler and writer named 
William Coxe was somewhat more complementary of the peasants’ mannerisms, yet he 
still described their circumstances as exceedingly oppressive and bleak.73  John Lloyd 
Stephens, an American who penned a travelogue of his 1832 visit, judged that peasants 
labored under conditions worst than those common among slaves on plantations in the 
American South.  He wrote, “Indeed, the marks of physical and personal degradation 
were so strong, that I was irresistibly compelled to abandon certain theories not 
uncommon among my countrymen at home, in regard to the intrinsic superiority of the 
white race above all others.”74   
While care must be taken to avoid over generalizing on the basis of such 
anecdotes, it is reasonable to conclude that the social and material condition of the 
Russian peasantry has historically been inferior to its Western counterparts.  Bolshevik 
intellectuals hoped that collectivization would remedy the situation, but if anything the 
disparity only increased.  The decades leading up to the cataclysmic events of the 1930s 
saw many real advances in the countryside, from emancipation in 1862 through the 
relative economic liberalization enjoyed under the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 
1920s.  However, all of this progress was wiped out by collectivization.  Sadly, 
descriptions of Russian village life by outside observers today often depict backward and 
degenerate behavior reminiscent of the accounts given by Perry, Coxe, Stephens, and 
others from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  For example, Grigory Ioffe and 
Tatyana Nefedova recount a 1995 visit to an independent collective farm in the 
Yaroslaval region where they observed that after workers received long delayed wages 
they immediately launched into a prolonged drinking binge lasting several days while the 
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farm’s neglected cattle suffered for want of feed and milking.  Emaciated cattle were 
slaughtered simply because their lethargic caretakers would not tend them.75  Accounts in 
the popular press frequently relate similar tales of drunkenness, lawlessness, and social 
depravity.   
A common thread in nearly all stories about the Russian village is alcoholism, 
which is the foremost impairment to the rural labor force.  Alcoholism has long been 
known to be a national epidemic and routinely garners the attention of political leaders.76  
The scope of the problem, particularly in rural areas is difficult to comprehend without 
firsthand experience.  As Ioffe has written, “the situation is apparently past the point 
when diagnoses like ‘drinking,’ ‘binge drinking,’ and perhaps even ‘alcoholism’ reflect 
the true meaning of the problem.  What is going on today is more aptly described as 
‘pervasive human degradation,’ ‘profound degeneration of the gene pool,’ and so on.”77  
The effect of alcoholism on agricultural production is significant.  To manage the 
problem, some farm managers have begun paying their workers with debit cards that 
cannot be used to purchase alcohol.  Others have forced workers to get surgical implants 
that induce physical and psychological discomfort when alcohol is consumed.  On 
independent collective farms, which rarely fire workers, drunkenness or working under 
the influence is often simply tolerated.78  The rural labor force’s proclivity for 
drunkenness is a common cause of complaint among newly arrived corporate operators.    
Crime has also emerged as a prominent and troubling feature of rural life during 
the post-Soviet era.  Recently, incidents of violent, organized crime in provincial areas 
have garnered significant media attention within Russia.  In many regions, criminal 
elements appear to have co-opted local officials, who tolerate or even benefit from their 
nefarious activities.  The brutal slaying of twelve individuals including four children at a 
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holiday gathering in Kushchevskaya in 2010 focused a spotlight on this issue, with 
President Dmitri Medvedev becoming personally involved in the ensuing public debate.79  
In many ways, rural criminal activity is a symptom of the same weak governing 
institutions and poor rule of law that hamper agricultural reforms and economic progress 
generally in Russia. 
The crime most commonly committed in the village is theft, which is so pervasive 
that it is often treated as a simple fact of life.  Because peasants were paid so little by the 
collective farms there was a strong incentive to steal.  The communist party discovered 
this almost immediately and attempted to combat it in 1932 with a draconian law 
proscribing the death penalty for the theft of state property.80  Over time however, such 
penalties proved to be impossible to carry out.  A recent study of rural attitudes indicates 
that a culture of theft exists in rural society.  It found that the incidence of theft in the 
village does not correlate with individual economic hardship and is better explained with 
reference to socio-cultural norms.81  It is also noteworthy that respondents in the survey 
drew a sharp distinction between theft from the collective farm and theft from 
individuals, with the former being significantly less deplorable.82  Corporate farm 
enterprises must spend significant sums protecting their investment from depredation.  
One operator in the Tambov region reports hiring a team of forty security guards to 
protect its 30,000 hectares of land.83  Such situations are typical, and yet the measures are 
often insufficient because the security guards themselves do not always refrain from 
helping themselves to the farm’s goods.  Other operators have turned to creative profit 
sharing or goods sharing arrangements in order to decrease incentives for theft. 
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All of these social problems exist against a backdrop of declining demographics 
and land abandonment.  The declining proportion of arable land under cultivation is 
rightly attributed to a combination of the declining capacity of collective farms and a 
correction from the irrational expansion of farming onto marginal land during the 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras.  But a comprehensive analysis of land abandonment 
published in 2004 found that the best predictor of which areas would actually suffer most 
from land abandonment was the degree of population decline experienced over time.  
Once population falls by a certain amount in a given region, land abandonment almost 
invariably follows.84  Demographically, rural Russia has been shrinking since the 
industrialization drive of the 1930s.  Rural birth rates have been below replacement level 
since 1992.  The combination of these factors has led to the specter of some settlements 
disappearing entirely.  Depopulation causes significant changes for individuals and 
families who are uprooted from current ways of life and forced to begin anew outside 
their native villages.  Those affected overwhelmingly express a desire to leave the rural 
lifestyle behind entirely by moving to cities, indicating that rural depopulation will likely 
increase urbanization.85 
D. ASSESSING REFORM  
In concluding this review of Russia’s agricultural reforms and recent 
performance, a measure of perspective is in order.  How does the Russian experience 
compare with that of other former communist states?  Between 1997 and 2005 the World 
Bank periodically released reports rating the effectiveness of agricultural reforms in the 
transitional economies of Europe and Central Asia.86  In their analysis, Russia has not 
realized the same degree of progress as some of its Western neighbors, particularly those 
who have pursued membership in the European Union.  It has however been more 
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successful than Belarus and some of the Central Asian Republics, which have made only 
limited progress in correcting the distortions of the communist era.  The World Bank 
measures take into account roughly the same factors as the Liefert and Swinnen 
framework utilized here, ranking progress in each area on a ten point scale with one 
indicating a planned economy and ten signifying completed market reforms.  Overall 
Russia is characterized as a moderate reformer, with its aggregate score improving 
slightly from 5.8 in 2000 to 6.6 in 2005.87  However, in the areas of market liberalization, 
farm restructuring and the creation of supporting market infrastructure its performance 
was static during the years in question.  Only the reform of upstream and downstream 
operations was judged to have progressed during the period, moving from 7 to 9.   
The 2006 report attributes the stagnation to “reform fatigue,” as lobbying by 
vested interests, concerns over food security, and the desire to maintain social safety nets 
have dampened enthusiasm for further changes.88  For better or worse, it appears that 
agricultural reform in Russia is largely complete insofar as the policies currently in place 
are not likely to be radically altered in the short- to medium-term.  This is not to say that 
conditions will remain static, merely that change is likely to be evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary.  Previous reform efforts will continue to mature.  New issues will arise.  
And broader trends in Russian politics and economics intersect with the agricultural 
sector.  The nature of these dynamics is to be explored under the three scenarios to be 
presented.   
E. TODAY’S TRENDS 
Before proceeding to the individual scenarios for Russian agriculture, let us 
summarize some of the prominent factors and current trends that inform their 
development.  These factors include the role of government, the rise of new operators, 
and the impact of rural social issues.  In each area, there are both causes for optimism as 
well as concern.  Overall, the consensus view is that Russian agriculture is on a growth 
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trajectory.  Crop yields have been trending upward for nearly a decade, most farms are 
profitable, and enthusiasm remains high among both domestic and foreign investors.  As 
opposed to the 1990s, the question among policymakers and industry actors now is not 
“what further reforms are needed to get things moving in the right direction,” but rather 
“how can the current momentum be sustained?” 
The changes in the Russian countryside over the past two decades have been of 
historic proportions.  No longer legally bound to the land, today the rural populace enjoys 
a degree of autonomy that is historically unprecedented.  Yet to this point, most rural 
communities and individuals have not benefitted economically; living conditions in the 
village remain oppressive and discouraging.  But significant changes may be taking root.  
Population trends and economic realities suggest that many individual villages will likely 
decline and eventually disappear.  The emergence and rapid expansion of commercial 
farming is changing the way people work the land and undermining the existing social 
order.  Given the endemic problems of the Russian village, this may actually be a positive 
development.  Simultaneously, the resurgence of Russian Agriculture means that it has 
the capacity to play a growing role in world markets, especially in grains.  Reforms have 
occurred gradually, but appear to have reached a relatively steady state reflecting the state 
capitalist philosophies and oligarchic tendencies that characterize the Russian economy 
1. The Role of the State 
As noted above, the state plays a heavy role in agriculture.  This is partly a legacy 
of the centralized agricultural system Russia inherited from its Soviet predecessor, and 
partly a reflection of the pragmatic reality that the private sector cannot yet fulfill all the 
various functions a market-based agricultural system requires.  It is worth noting that 
Russia is by no means unique in this regard: governments everywhere—especially in 
advanced countries—insert themselves heavily in agricultural affairs in order to achieve 
various policy objectives.  As is usually the case, state involvement in Russia has both 
positive and negative aspects.  To a large degree the resurgence of Russian agriculture 
since 1998 can be traced to more proactive, even interventionist, government policies.  
By guaranteeing financing, promoting trade policies favorable to domestic producers, and 
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standardizing property laws, these policies have stabilized the sector and provided a 
foundation for growth going forward.   
Wegren offers compelling evidence suggesting that some of the biggest 
beneficiaries have actually been private farmers, who occupy a position between 
household subsistence farming and the large-scale corporate operators.  Farming an 
average of around fifty hectares, these farms now account for twenty percent of all 
agricultural land.  His data suggest that by most measures these private farmers are 
significantly better off today than they were a decade ago.  He suggests these results 
demonstrate that illiberal regimes can indeed promote the growth of healthy, private 
enterprise.89  This idea will be explored in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
Unquestionably, the character of the Russian state does contribute to persistent 
problems that continue to plague the entire business sector, including agriculture.  There 
is little discernable movement to clean up opaque governmental practices that create 
considerable uncertainty for producers, investors, and consumers.  In particular, Russia’s 
failure to develop an independent judiciary means that enforcing contracts and defending 
legal and property rights will remain problematic.  Given the government’s lack of 
transparency, the sometimes-capricious nature of its decisionmaking, and the country’s 
tradition of authoritarianism, there is often a higher degree of uncertainty in predicting 
future policies in Russia than in other transitional and emerging economies.  Uncertainty 
is a notorious enemy of investment and innovation.  In spite of continuing assurances, the 
government’s equivocal commitment to free markets has the potential to temper the 
present enthusiasm of investors and limit future productivity improvements.  The grain 
export ban imposed in 2010 served as a reminder that Russia’s market environment is 
still heavily influenced by state intervention in support of political ends. 
2. The Rise of New Operators 
Arguably, the single most significant development in Russian agriculture has been 
the rise of large-scale corporate farming.  Some hypothesize that corporate farms 
                                                 
89  Stephen K. Wegren, "Private Farming in Russia: An Emerging Success?" Post-Soviet Affairs 26, 
no. 2 (2011). 
 42 
increasingly will be the model of choice in Russia.  The numerous failures of independent 
collective farms are apparent to all, and individual or family farming shows no signs of 
taking root at present.  Additionally, the administrative costs of farming in Russia favor 
large-scale production: employing security personnel, complying with government 
regulations, and overcoming bureaucratic obstacles requires a large cadre of specialists 
that only larger producers can afford to maintain.  Moreover, in the oligarchic Russian 
system, large enterprises with wealthy and politically connected owners have tended to 
fare much better than their smaller competitors.  This same pattern appears to be 
emerging in the agricultural sector with the most prominent corporate farm operators 
displaying the same oligarchic tendencies observed in other industries.  
In fact, much of the optimism regarding agricultural production can be traced to 
the rise of the new operators.  Citing this trend a recent U.S. Department of Agriculture 
analysis concluded that Russia is poised to become the world’s largest grain exporter by 
2020.90  Media accounts on the resurgence of Russian agriculture also tend to be positive, 
usually highlighting the success of corporate farming in reclaiming fallow fields, 
employing modern technology, and increasing crop yields.  
There are also numerous practical constraints that must be addressed.  Most of 
these have been mentioned previously: high debt loads among farm operators, labor 
impairments among the rural workforce, substandard infrastructure, and so forth.  Recent 
performance and successes suggest that none of these issues are insurmountable.  As the 
system grows and matures, many may prove to be self-correcting.  For example, given 
future world population projections and the historically high world prices for foodstuffs 
observed recently, there are powerful economic motivators for Russia to upgrade its rural 
infrastructure, particularly to support lucrative grain exports.  These forces should 
encourage an overall expansion of both private and public investment.   
                                                 
90  Liefert et al., Former Soviet Union Region to Play Larger Role in Meeting World Wheat Needs, 14. 
 43 
3. The Impact of Rural Social Issues 
The arrival of new operators in the Russian village is highlighting the social 
issues handicapping the rural labor force and driving changes in employment patterns.  
The new operators almost always employ fewer workers that the old collective farm and 
can freely fire unproductive workers.  Aside from engendering resentment in the village, 
this has also contributed to persistently high unemployment rates in rural areas.  One 
economic analysis concluded that agricultural labor utilization in Russian agriculture is 
20% below its optimum level, suggesting that farms should be able to increase production 
and profits just by hiring more workers.91  The high unemployment rate suggests that 
there should be labor available, so why aren’t farms employing more people?  The 
answer becomes clear when one visits a rural village.  To quote one field researcher, 
“most of those unemployed are actually unemployable because of binge drinking.  Firing 
them under the old Soviet system of labor management was next to impossible.  While it 
is quite possible now, finding a sober replacement is more problematic than before.”92   
This leads to a question with far reaching implications: in this new environment, 
can the current village culture persist with so many of its members unproductive?  Given 
the modernizing forces at work in rural Russia, it is difficult to see how some the 
characteristics of village life, such as guaranteed subsistence employment and the 
accompanying tolerance of idleness and apathy, can continue.  Such attitudes are 
arguably the product of an enabling communal social structure, which the rise of agro-
industrial enterprises is steadily eroding.  Rural workers are increasingly confronted with 
the reality that they must be productive individually in order to survive.  Trends in rural 
attitudes also suggest that a fundamental shift may be on the horizon.  Studies suggest 
that agricultural workers are increasing expressing greater willingness to labor for wages 
rather than in traditional communal farming relationships.  Sociologist Ilya Shteinberg 
suggests that this finding underscores a fundamental change of values in favor of 
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corporate farming over communal farming.  He concludes that traditional Russian 
peasant culture, which is fundamentally rooted in communal agriculture, may wither 
away in coming years.93  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that migrant and seasonal workers may already be 
displacing some unproductive Russian workers.  Machinery operators are in high demand 
on the farms of Southern Russia, but managers continually struggle to find qualified 
(sober) employees among the indigenous population.  This has led to a situation reported 
by Tatyana Nefedova:  
In recent years a seasonal migration has developed: operators of grain 
harvesting combines from Turkey bring their machines to Russia after the 
harvest in their country is over and they work in exchange for 15 to 20 
percent of the harvested grain.  Their combines are the world’s best 
brands, and the harvesters’ labor ethic is exemplary.  They work day and 
night, using Meskhetian Turkish migrants from Central Asia as their 
interpreters.94   
Given Russia’s declining population, increased immigration is probably 
inevitable.  In light of these pressures it seems likely that peasant culture will be forced to 
change significantly in coming decades in response to unprecedented changes.  Ideally 
the end result will be a rural population less encumbered by the debilitating social 
problems that have been so prevalent for generations.  In any case, the future 
development of Russian agriculture will undoubtedly be influenced significantly by the 
social context in which it takes place. 
                                                 
93  Ilya Shteinberg, "Ostanyotsya Li v Rossii Krestyanin?" Otyetsyestvennie Zapiski 15, no. 1 (2004). 
http://www.strana-oz.ru/?numid=16&article=747. 
94  Ioffe, Nefedova and Zaslavsky, The End of Peasantry? The Disintegration of Rural Russia, 103.  
 45 
III. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION 
SCENARIO 
Economic and political liberalization is precisely what Western economists have 
consistently prescribed for Russia for more than two decades.  Yet, when some of their 
proposed remedies were adopted in the 1990s, overall performance was decidedly 
uneven.  The 2000s witnessed a broad trend toward greater centralization of political 
control and increased state intervention in economic affairs.  This was also a period of 
markedly improved economic performance, which political leaders were quick to 
associate with their policies.  Yet today, there is also a growing sense that the 
consolidation of political and economic power has had some notable deleterious effects, 
including cronyism, corruption, and the stifling of public political debate.  To date these 
concerns have not coalesced into a coherent political movement demanding broad based 
changes to the status quo.  However, should such a movement emerge it would likely 
open the possibility that Russia could once again take up the banner of liberalizing 
reform.  In order to lay the foundations for examining the potential impact of economic 
and political liberalization on agriculture, this chapter will first explore the narrative that 
has emerged with respect to liberal reform during the post-Soviet period.  This will 
provide a foundational background from which to consider how a renewed commitment 
to liberalizing economic and political reforms would impact agricultural production and 
the rural Russian populace.  
A. THE HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF LIBERAL REFORM 
The shock therapy policies of the early Yeltsin era were designed to quickly 
transform the command economy.  An ardent faith in the ability of markets to correct the 
country’s woes was common among reformers of the era.95  Unfortunately, it eventually 
became clear that the nascent markets of the early 1990s lacked the institutional supports 
needed to function properly.  Although a few talented or fortunate individuals amassed 
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significant wealth during this time, the economy as a whole contracted precipitously, with 
a corresponding decline in economic well being for most Russians.  This culminated in 
the ruble crash of 1998, which wiped out the savings of many individuals for the second 
time within a decade.  In the eyes of many Russians, the experience served to discredit 
economic reformers and their ideals. 
In the wake of the Soviet collapse, most Russians had ardently proclaimed a 
desire for “democracy.”  But institutionally, liberalism never made significant or lasting 
inroads within the political system.  President Yeltsin’s high-handed dealings with 
parliament in the early 1990s gave birth to a strong presidential system with relatively 
few checks on the power of the executive.  Openness and transparency never came close 
to Western democratic standards.  With the failure of the government’s liberal economic 
policies, political liberalism was also discredited, even though it had never really been 
much more than a superficial feature of the Russian system under Yeltsin. 
By the time Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency in 2000, Western style 
political and economic liberalism held little appeal to many Russians; in their view that 
path had been tried and found wanting.96  Putin gradually, but consistently, began to 
reassert government influence over “critical” segments of the economy.  Improved 
administrative capacity to collect taxes and rising world energy prices contributed to 
dramatically improved government finances.  As the economy began to grow and the 
economic fortunes of individuals began to improve, state intervention in economic affairs 
gained greater legitimacy.  Economic strength also gave impetus to a new Russian 
assertiveness in foreign affairs.  Putin’s own popularity soared as he was credited with 
leading the nation’s resurgence. 
If the Yeltsin era created disenchantment with liberal political ideals, the Putin era 
witnessed their implicit repudiation.  In an attempt to address the governance issues that 
plagued his predecessors, Putin undertook measures designed to increase the authority 
and power of the central government.  These included the abolishment of elections for 
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regional governorships in favor of direct presidential appointments and the assertion of 
government control over several broadcast media outlets.  The prosecution and 
imprisonment of Yukos chairman Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was interpreted as a warning 
to oligarchs that the new political leadership expected them to cooperate or face severe 
consequences.  Influential positions were increasingly filled by individuals who, like 
Putin himself, had links to the state security apparatus.  These siloviki generally cast a 
jaundiced eye toward popular political participation, while embracing an economic 
program that has been referred to as “market authoritarianism.”97  Cronyism, corruption, 
and constraints on political expression are unsavory, yet salient features of the regime 
that emerged from these changes.   
Much of the economic revival of the past decade can be traced to favorable 
market conditions for raw materials, most prominently oil and natural gas.  The 2008 
financial crisis has, in some respects, served as a warning regarding the dangers of heavy 
reliance on resource exports.98  As foreign demand for these items declined, GDP and 
government revenues both fell sharply, evoking memories of earlier travails.  Three years 
later growth has resumed as oil prices have rebounded.  Nevertheless, calls for 
diversifying the economy have increased.  Business leaders consistently lobby for an 
improved investment environment to foster non-energy growth.  Government leaders 
have expressed rhetorical support and even championed some initiatives to this end.  But 
many question the sincerity of their commitment.  Recovering world oil prices have 
alleviated the immediate need to reduce dependence on energy exports, and skeptics fear 
that it will be too easy for leaders to simply do nothing so long as the revenues continue 
to flow. 
On the political front, there appears to be growing dissatisfaction with the 
ineffectiveness and corruption of the ruling regime.  While still sporting approval ratings 
that would be the envy of almost any Western politician, in the lead up to the 2012 
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presidential election both Putin and Medvedev have seen their popularity decline from 
previous highs.99  Popular disgust with reports of blatant corruption and misappropriation 
of government resources has given rise to public calls for greater transparency and 
accountability.  Medvedev in particular has expressed a willingness to address these 
issues.  Under his direction, new policies have been implemented requiring government 
officials to provide more detailed financial disclosures and preventing them from serving 
on the boards of state owned companies.  Other initiatives include significant pay 
increases for police officers (intended to discourage bribe taking) and a purge of many 
higher-ranking officials within the notoriously corrupt interior ministry.  Again, skeptics 
express doubts about the real significance of these actions.  Some question the whether 
Medvedev is sincere in his efforts.  Others, willing to accept his commitment as genuine, 
question whether or not he can succeed without a greater level of institution commitment 
to transparency. 
Nevertheless, the fact that this debate is occurring at all suggests that scenarios 
under which Russia does embrace genuine political and economic reform over the next 
decade have a reasonable basis for consideration.  Developments leading up to the 
parliamentary elections scheduled for December 2011 and the presidential election to 
follow in March have made clear that the more conservative Putin remains the senior 
partner in the ruling tandem.  While it is difficult to predict exactly how these elections 
will ultimately influence the political landscape, liberalizing measures are a part of the 
debate.  This underscores the fact that political and economic liberalization is not a dead 
issue.  Undoubtedly, many entrenched interests, including the siloviki, would strongly 
oppose such measures.  
B. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT OF LIBERAL REFORMS  
Effective political and economic liberalization could be expected to increase 
overall agricultural production, but would have side effects harmful to some actors.  
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Successful reforms would help create a stable business and investment environment 
conducive to sustainable long-term growth.  Improved rule of law would reduce 
uncertainty, encouraging capital investment in rural infrastructure, land improvement, 
and farm implements.  Presumably, Russia would grow closer to the West and become 
more integrated with European and global agricultural markets.  This would enhance 
Russia’s position with respect to crops where it enjoys a comparative advantage, such as 
grains.  However, closer integration would also bring greater competition, potentially 
harming producers of certain types of goods.  More broadly, this integration would likely 
facilitate increased labor mobility.  Larger numbers of non-Russian workers are likely to 
enter the rural workforce, significantly changing the character of the Russian village.100 
1. Agricultural Production 
In one form or another, the poor quality of the agribusiness environment has 
underlain the complaints of farmers, food processors, and rural officials throughout the 
post-Soviet era.  In the 1990s, an exceedingly chaotic environment decimated farms when 
state withdrawal virtually eliminated the sole source of working and investment capital.  
As illustrated in Chapter II, Russia has recently made significant strides in creating new 
avenues for investment and credit to flow to producers.  However, the government’s 
arbitrary policies; confusing, inconsistent application of laws and regulations; and weak 
administrative capacity to handle private property matters all foster uncertainties that 
constrain both investment and productivity.  The objective conditions needed to improve 
the business environment are fairly clear: a firm and clear commitment to rule of law, a 
reliable system for enforcing contract law, and an institutional commitment to advance 
private property rights. 
Liberalizing reforms would address each of these problem areas.  The creation of 
a credible civil judicial system to mediate disputes would be a prominent reform goal.  
Such a system would give farmers, investors, and workers an avenue to challenge 
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arbitrary policies or defend against violations of property rights.  Improved rule of law 
flowing from this system would create an atmosphere of greater predictability.  While 
Russia has adopted private land ownership in principle, as a practical matter it is still very 
difficult to transfer ownership of property.101  With its fundamental faith in private 
property rights, liberalism would encourage formation of the institutions needed to build 
a healthy private property market.  A genuine, active property market would, in turn, 
enhance the ability of farmers to use land as collateral in order to improve or expand their 
operations.  Indeed, the two biggest benefits springing from such reforms would be an 
increased incentive for owners to invest in their property and a reduction in the cost of 
capital investment (due to the reduced perception of risk.)  These two factors would 
encourage farmers to employ newer technologies and improved farming methods that 
promise higher yields.  Total land under cultivation would also be expected to increase, 
although it is unlikely to rebound to the economically irrational levels of the late Soviet 
era.   
Not every agricultural enterprise would benefit from the changes set in motion by 
reform.  Liberalization would naturally inform Russia’s long debated accession to the 
WTO.  While WTO membership may occur under other scenarios as well, liberal 
political and economic reforms would make accession a virtual certainty.102  As a 
condition of membership, Russia will almost certainly be required to reduce the level of 
state support to farming activities.  This prospect has reportedly led the agricultural 
ministry to strongly oppose WTO membership during intergovernmental debates.  The 
ministry’s position is in line with the consensus view of within the agricultural sector that 
reduced subsidies would be detrimental.  Influential WTO members, including the United 
States, Australia, and the European Union, have long complained about Russia’s import 
quotas on meat products.  Inasmuch as they limit exposure to foreign competition, these 
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quotas are very favorable to Russian producers.  It is reasonable to assume that as a 
condition of its accession, Russia would have to eliminate them.  Increased competition 
from imports is certain to have an adverse effect on domestic producers.  For geographic 
reasons, meat production in Russia tends carry higher production costs even under the 
best of circumstances.103  Therefore, WTO accession can be expected to reduce overall 
meat production.  Some analysts suggest that such a development would harm small 
producers the most, with larger producers better able to cope in the new competitive 
environment.104  In any case, the government’s stated goal of 85% sufficiency in meat 
production would become unrealistic.  Market forces would compel the country to 
become more reliant on imports to satisfy consumer demand.  
Conversely, Russia stands to benefit in areas where it enjoys competitive 
advantages.  Foremost among these is grain.  The country’s grain export potential has 
been widely recognized in recent years.  Yet, it has also gained a reputation as an 
unreliable supplier causing Russian grain to trade at a price discount on international 
markets relative to exports from other regions.105  Political and economic liberalization 
would improve transparency and reduce the likelihood that Russia would adopt strong 
anti-market policies.  This should help Russia establish itself as a more responsible 
trading partner, reducing the need cut prices in order to attract buyers.  The improved 
investment and business environment would also help Russia build the storage, transport, 
and export infrastructure required to meet its grain producing potential.  
Russia’s emergence as a significant and reliable grain exporter would have a 
notable impact far beyond its own borders.  According to a recent study published by 
Dutch agricultural lender Rabobank, by 2050 worldwide production of cereal crops will 
need to increase by 110% in order to accommodate population growth and changes in 
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dietary patterns.106  In casting about for sources to support this enormous growth, Russia 
emerges as a leading candidate.  Possessing vast amounts of available farmland and 
adequate water supplies, Russia is viewed as having vast untapped growth potential.  
Liberalization would create the best conditions for this potential to be fully realized.  
In this new environment, which producers are most likely to benefit?  Based on 
current trends, it would appear that larger corporate producers would be positioned to 
gain the most from liberalization.  Indeed, liberalization would likely serve to reinforce 
transformative processes already underway, converting the remnants of former collective 
farms into modern agro-industrial enterprises.  These farms would be the most attractive 
targets for private investment (especially foreign investment,) due to their professional 
management cadres, greater willingness to employ advanced farming methods, and 
favorable access to capital.  Other large producers would likewise be driven to improve 
their own efficiency in order to survive in a more competitive market with fewer 
government supports.  The decline of the legacy collective farm as an agricultural 
producer, already well under way, would be accelerated. 
Small independent farmers, who were championed by early agrarian reformers, 
have recently begun to demonstrate notable strength as well.  These operators, who 
generally farm less than 200 hectares, have seen impressive growth in terms of overall 
production, household income, and household wealth over the past decade.  Indeed, 
Wegren argues that they have been the biggest beneficiaries from what he terms “the 
Keynesian strategy of targeted intervention” employed by the government during the 
Putin-Medvedev era.107  Because liberalization and WTO membership is likely to curtail 
the overall scope of this intervention, these independent private farmers will certainly feel 
some impact.  But these smaller producers would also be among the biggest beneficiaries 
of market transparency, improved access to credit, and the institutionalization of private 
property rights.  Although some farmers would undoubtedly suffer due to increased 
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competition from food imports, overall, liberalization would be a positive development 
for independent private farmers. 
2. Rural Social Impacts 
Despite their monumental significance for the agricultural sector, all of the 
aforementioned changes would be essentially evolutionary in nature.  Liberal reform is, 
after all, not altogether new: it was initially introduced more than twenty years ago.  The 
most revolutionary impacts of political and economic liberalization would be felt by the 
traditional backbone of agrarian Russia—the peasantry.  Political and economic 
liberalization would reduce Russian insularity as the country draws closer to Western 
European ideals.  Russia would become a full participant in globalization.  A prominent 
feature of globalization is labor mobility.  One needs only read one of the numerous 
accounts of Polish plumbers now working in Great Britain or Mexican construction 
workers building grain silos in Iowa to recognize that labor markets are increasingly 
integrated.  Liberalization would draw Russia into this global labor market, with 
potentially tectonic effects on rural society. 
One of the foremost complaints of farm managers today is the low quality of the 
agricultural labor force due to alcohol dependency and poor work ethic.  So far migrant 
labor has not been widely employed in Russia.  However, this would quickly change as 
the country became more closely with integrated with neighbors in both Europe and Asia.  
Restrictive controls over cross-border travel would almost certainly be relaxed. Because 
its economy offers high wages and good living standards relative to much of the world, 
whether legally employable or not, agricultural workers from developing countries, 
including those on its periphery, would likely see Russia as an attractive place to take 
their skills.  Several of Russia’s neighbors have huge unemployed youth populations at a 
time when Russia is in demographic decline.  Given these dynamics it seems inevitable 
that foreign labor would flow into the Russian countryside.   
Where will this leave rural Russians?  Already today the countryside is home to a 
sizable underproductive class of people with bleak economic prospects.  This group 
would be expected to grow considerably if rural laborers were forced to compete with 
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outsiders.  Given the insular character of the Russian countryside, the new arrivals are 
almost sure to be seen as invaders taking Russian jobs.  Resentment would lead to social 
unrest and calls for the government to protect the interests of its citizens.  The liberalizing 
reforms that enabled the influx of foreigners are likely be maligned by those displaced.  
Developed nations have consistently responded to such challenges by creating more 
robust social safety nets.  A westward-oriented government would likely respond 
similarly, leaving many rural Russians even more reliant on the state to provide for their 
well being.  However, the import of such an institutional response could be outweighed 
by the collective reaction of individuals.  Since at least the 1920s, rural Russians have 
consistently sought opportunities to flee to urban areas in order to escape difficult 
circumstances in their villages.  Increased labor competition would only increase 
motivation to emigrate.  The resulting exodus would accelerate the disintegration of 
traditional economic and social linkages in the village.  The “end of peasantry” posited 
by Nefedova, Shteinberg, and others would come about even more rapidly as the role of 
outsiders becomes more pronounced.   
Liberalizing political and economic reforms hold tremendous potential to increase 
the pace of modernization in rural Russia.  An improved agribusiness environment would 
lead to a rise in overall agricultural productivity.  Reforms would almost certainly lead to 
greater integration with the globalized economy, subjecting the country to the same kinds 
of economic trends observed elsewhere.  By facilitating cross-border labor mobility, 
liberalizing reforms would introduce more foreigners into the Russian village, speeding 
up transformative processes already underway there.  Labor competition would force 
native Russians to either improve their competitive position or face marginalization.  This 
competition may encourage a reassessment of rural social problems and a renewed effort 
on the part of government and society to address them.  In order to avoid broad social 
unrest, some type of policy response would likely be developed to assist those who are 
left behind.  The one certainty is that the traditional Russian peasantry would be radically 




IV. BUSINESS AS USUAL SCENARIO 
Corresponding with Dator’s stability image, this scenario assumes that significant 
changes to the Russian political and economic landscape will not occur over the coming 
decade.  The political culture, patterns of governance, and economic norms that 
developed during the Putin presidency of the 2000s, while not entirely unchallenged, will 
nevertheless prove stable.  Given the near certainty of Putin’s reelection as President in 
2012, and the likelihood that he will remain the preeminent Russian political figure for 
the foreseeable future, a status quo scenario is assessed to be the most probable of those 
considered.  This chapter will first explore the nature and internal logic of the current 
regime’s governing philosophy and dynamics in order to better understand how they 
affect the rural economy and agricultural policy.  This will facilitate consideration of two 
major questions: Assuming there is not significant change to the current regime’s 
approach how will Russian agriculture evolve in coming years?  How will that evolution 
impact Russians living in rural areas, and what does it mean for rural society at large? 
A. THE CHARACTER AND NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY 
GOVERNANCE 
It is impossible to properly understand the nature of the current Russian political 
and economic order without reference to the regimes that preceded it.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the impulse toward centralized power that emerged under Vladimir 
Putin was part of a broad rejection of the politics and failed economic policies of the 
Yeltsin era.  The system that emerged has three salient features that provide valuable 
insight into how it functions.  First, popular political participation is conspicuously 
absent.  Second, low levels of trust characterize both political and economic interactions 
at all levels.  And third, for all its flaws, the current system does effectively control the 
worst impulses of the small political elite by regulating their competition for power. 
The non-participatory nature of Russian politics is rooted in the nation’s political 
culture.  A classical definition describes political culture as an amalgamation of societal 
attitudes toward the political system, including its institutions, and the perceived role of 
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the individual within that system.108  As Fareed Zakaria has noted, political culture can 
be notoriously difficult to analyze due to its complexity: virtually any phenomenon to be 
found if one looks hard enough.109  Nevertheless, it is possible to discern certain patterns 
of political behavior in Russian society and to explain the influence these patterns have.  
Historically speaking, Russia has little tradition of civic involvement in political affairs 
and decisionmaking.  The Soviet regime, like its tsarist predecessor, was an autocracy 
ruled by a small elite.  Decisionmaking processes were opaque and the resulting policy 
was a confused combination of edict and bureaucratic machination.  As in earlier eras, the 
political “rules,” such as they were, were largely unwritten, known by those who needed 
to know them, and unknown outside those circles.110  To the extent that average 
individuals were brought into the political process, it was to lend legitimacy to the 
policies decided upon by the elites; the people had no real voice.  After Stalin’s death, the 
prevailing social compact required citizens to remain apolitical and forego a variety of 
individual rights.  In exchange, the state provided security and a minimal level of material 
comfort.  The gradual dissolution of this compact during the Brezhnev era was a central 
factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Indeed, although there is considerable debate 
over the extent to which Gorbachev possessed an overarching political vision, his 
Glasnost and Perestroika policies can be properly viewed as attempts to redefine the 
relationship between the party-state and its citizens. 
The last decade has seen a partial return to practices of the past, which, however 
flawed, are popularly perceived to be better than the disorder of the 1990s.111  The state 
is once again in the hands of a small group of autocratically minded elites disinclined 
toward genuine popular political participation.  Individuals enjoy considerable personal 
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liberty to pursue their own interests, so long as those interests do not run counter to those 
of the regime.  The resultant social compact allows, and even encourages, individuals to 
seek rising living standards, improved education, and social mobility so long as they 
remain apolitical.  The legitimacy of the state (and therefore the government and the 
regime as well) is based on its ability to maintain security and stability.  The message, as 
Lilya Shevtsova describes it, is “do as you please, just don’t try to seize power.”112  For 
the most part, Russian society has acquiesced.  Relatively few are inclined toward 
political activism, political parties remain the tools of leading elites rather than 
participatory institutions, and there is only muted outcry against the proscription of 
political and civil liberties.  This was most recently underscored by the resigned public 
response to Putin’s decision to reassume the presidency.  
The second salient feature informing the character of Russia’s ruling regime is a 
low level of social trust, both between the government and the people, and on an 
interpersonal level throughout society.  Ronald Inglehart has presented evidence showing 
that low-trust societies tend to demonstrate a marked disposition toward authoritarianism 
rather than liberal democracy.  Such societies also tend to have weak rule of law.113  This 
helps explain why Russia has historically embraced a fundamentally different social 
conception of the judicial system.  In a liberal democracy the legal system generally 
serves to protect the rights of the individual from infringement by both the government 
and other individuals.  In contrast, the Russian legal system has traditionally served not as 
a defender of the weak, but as a tool to protect the interests of the state and the regime.  
Protections for individuals have been minimal while the law itself retained a certain 
arbitrary quality.  One of the pernicious effects of this dynamic is a delegitimization of 
the law in the eyes of the populace.  Because the law does not serve the interests of the 
public, individuals feel less obligated to comply with its demands, particularly when there 
is a low likelihood of punishment for non-compliance.  This creates a “regime of soft 
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legal constraints” wherein “rules are broken in a standardized way.”114  More broadly, 
low levels of social trust encourage the atomization of Russian society, inhibiting its 
ability to pull together in dynamic support of national projects or ideals.115   
How can order be maintained in such an environment?  Putin’s solution has been 
to build and maintain credible, centralized political power with the capacity to impose a 
degree of order amidst the chaos.  Russia’s strong presidential system facilitates this.  
Power is concentrated in the person of the president, who is able to manage competing 
clans who otherwise would co-opt the government and the bureaucracy to an 
unmanageable degree.  In the view of Putin and his associates, the fatal flaw of Yeltsin’s 
government was that it was too weak to prevent powerful interests from co-opting the 
machinery of the state.  Under the current regime, the president has the ability to curb the 
worse abuses and arbitrarily apply his power to enforce certain norms of behavior among 
the political elite.  Individuals frequently ignore the law when they feel they can safely do 
so, but there is always a risk that officials in positions of authority may intervene for their 
own reasons, including personal profit.  The system tolerates corruption so long as “rules 
are broken in a standardized way” according to an “unwritten” understanding.  Such a 
closed system is loath to acknowledge intangible external constraints, including such 
liberal principles as rule of law or personal property rights, preferring to either deny their 
applicability to current circumstances or to simply ignore them outright. 
While the outside observer may judge the tendencies and characteristics described 
in the preceding paragraphs to be backward or illogical, the simple fact is in Russia’s 
contemporary context they often work well enough.  For many Russians, the proof is in 
the results.  And the results show that the return to these traditional patterns of Russian 
governance, and the implicit rejection of Western liberalism that accompanied it, has 
coincided with a broad recovery from the post-Soviet malaise.  Moreover, while 
businessmen and investors may complain about uncertainty, conditions today are far 
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more predictable in almost every respect than they were in the mid-1990s.  Are there 
flaws?  Absolutely; the preceding chapters have enumerated many of them in 
considerable detail.  Nevertheless, a measure of perspective is in order.  Objectively 
speaking, Putin’s approach has created stability and predictability for the vast majority of 
Russians.  This is especially true in the agricultural sector, which has seen virtually all of 
its post-Soviet gains come after his policies were implemented. 
A persuasive argument can be advanced that, despite its numerous flaws, the 
governing system Russia has today serves its people better than any they have enjoyed 
during the last century, or perhaps ever before in their history.  For this reason, it is 
important not to underestimate the staying power of the status quo.  Not only do 
entrenched interests stand behind it, it continues to enjoy a notable measure of popular 
support as well.  While criticism is widespread and credible, the Putin philosophy is 
likely to remain ascendant because of the relative stability and predictability it provides 
for a nation with a living memory of what chaos and disorder mean. 
B. FUTURE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE STATUS 
QUO 
The agricultural status quo is based on a strong government commitment to 
support private agricultural enterprise.  The state has at least an indirect role in nearly 
every facet of agricultural production.  A status quo scenario assumes that this will 
remain the government’s preferred approach; therefore current agricultural trends will 
continue.  Overall production will grow modestly as new techniques are adopted, farms 
gradually become more efficient, and infrastructure is incrementally improved.  Due to 
business uncertainties and the relatively inefficient government bureaucracy, explosive 
agricultural growth is unlikely to occur.  While improving, crop yields will continue to 
trend below comparable yields in other regions, even when adjusted for climate.  
Governmental policy will attempt to ameliorate the worst impacts for agricultural 
producers in down years.  However, due to systemic weaknesses, farms will not enjoy the 
full impact of above-average harvests either.   
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1. Economic Evolution 
Of all the roles the agricultural ministry plays, perhaps none is as vital as its role 
as the primary provider of capital.  Effective interest rates on long-term agricultural loans 
are reportedly about six percent, with rates for working capital around four percent.116  
Given the level of perceived risk, private lenders are unwilling to extend loans at those 
rates.  If the status quo prevails going forward, this dynamic is unlikely to change and 
farmers will remain heavily reliant on state agricultural banks for financing.  The state 
will be under strong political pressure to continue providing credit subsidies in order to 
avoid a production collapse.   
Despite enjoying relatively low interest rates, Russian farms still carry heavy debt 
loads.  This hampers their ability to manage the impact of a poor harvest.  As the primary 
creditor, and in its self-appointed role as guarantor of agricultural prosperity, the 
government has in the past elected to step up its support during difficult years.  The poor 
harvest of 2010 led to a raft of emergency measures designed to help producers.  These 
included additional interest subsidies, direct monetary transfers to replenish working 
capital, and preferential tariff rates for rail transport.117  So long as the status quo 
prevails, such responses will be the norm in lean years.  
Conversely, in good years, farmers are unlikely to enjoy the benefits of above 
average harvests.  In fact a bumper crop can actually be detrimental to farmers because of 
the tendency for excess supply to suppress prices.  One attractive solution to this dilemma 
is to sell the excess on international markets, where, presumably, Russian excess could 
make up for below average production in other regions.  Unfortunately, the infrastructure 
woes detailed in chapter two make this approach impractical.  Insufficient storage, 
decaying rail networks, and inadequate port capacity all inhibit Russia’s ability to 
effectively get an above average harvest from the field to market.  As a result, prices in 
                                                 
116  Irina Chechurina, "India Abroad: Farming Profits on Russian Land," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 
http://indrus.in/articles/2011/08/22/india_abroad_farming_profits_on_russian_land_12896.html (accessed 
August 23, 2011). 
117  Vassilieva, Agricultural Development Program in 2010 and Priorities for 2011, GAIN Report no. 
1106. 
 61 
domestic markets plummet in such years leaving farmers to sell their crops at small 
margins.  Once again, this obliges the government to step in as a buyer of last resort in 
order to set a price floor.  Clearly, better infrastructure would help alleviate these issues 
and make it easier to for farms to capitalize on good harvests.  But who will build it?  
Once again, due to the perceived risk private enterprise has been reticent to make the 
needed investments, leaving the government as the primary provider.  Political leaders 
have announced many building programs, and undoubtedly will continue to introduce 
more.  Indeed, one of the avowed purposes of the United Grain Company is to improve 
agricultural infrastructure.118  However, given the scope of the problem it is unlikely that 
the government alone will be able to solve it.  Private investment will be needed.  This 
leads to the inevitable conclusion that so long as the agricultural investment environment 
continues to be viewed as risky, the infrastructure challenges will remain.  Consequently, 
under the status quo scenario, farmers will continue to suffer from poor market conditions 
in years with bumper harvests.  Price supports will be essential in such years in order to 
guarantee a minimal profit.   
The current regime has consistently demonstrated a commitment to build and 
maintain the country’s agricultural base.  As Wegren argues, even illiberal regimes can 
foster economic development based on capitalist principles.  The record of the past 
decade indicates that Russia has had some notable successes in this regard.  Assuming the 
status quo continues, the government can be expected to continue to pursue policies 
similar to what has worked in the past.  However, its state-sponsored approach has 
notable weaknesses.  These include a poor investment climate that hampers its ability to 
attract sorely needed private capital to compliment state initiatives, an outsized 
dependence on government intervention in both good times and bad, and an unwieldy, 
inefficient bureaucracy strained to effectively carry out the myriad functions required of 
it.  
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2. Social Evolution 
In the context of the interventionist approach outlined above, rural Russians will 
continue to see notable changes over the next decade, reinforcing the existing trends 
identified in chapter two.  The current regime sees Russia’s agricultural rebound as an 
important proof of its legitimacy, and will be keen to maintain it.  Moreover, the 
conservative nature of many rural Russians makes it a natural constituency for leaders 
like Putin.  Election season often witnesses populist pandering to rural interests.  This is 
certainly a trend that will be in evidence in the lead up to the 2012 presidential election.  
This empowers farm and rural interests.  Indeed, one notable political development over 
the past decade has been the increasing organizational strength of farm lobbies, such as 
the Russian Grain Union, the Russian Meatpackers Union, and the private farmer 
association known by its acronym AKKOR, all of have also become notable advocates 
within their respective spheres.  Largely absent from national political debates during the 
1990s, these organizations are making rural interests politically prominent once again and 
winning the support of leading politicians.  Under the status quo scenario, these groups 
will continue to influence policy and ensure that, unlike during the Yeltsin years, the 
concerns of agriculture receive due consideration in Moscow. 
However, rural Russian communities and individuals will continue to experience 
vast social challenges.  The decline of the peasantry discussed in chapter two will 
continue, as private farms increasingly become the model of choice across the 
countryside.  While the influx of outsiders into the village will undoubtedly increase, it is 
likely the regime will attempt to limit the number of non-Russians who would be accused 
of taking Russian jobs.  However, their ability to actually execute an effective program to 
curtail the potential use of undocumented workers is questionable.  The mixed experience 
of even well-developed countries in managing this issue suggests it will not be easy for 
the government to head off labor competition.  It is easy to envision scenarios in which 
xenophobic tendencies lead to discrimination or violence against the new arrivals and add 
yet another social problem to the already troubled Russian village.  While it is impractical 
to speculate how these developments will play out in detail, under the status quo one near 
certainty is that the government will attempt to insulate ethnic Russians to some extent 
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from the arrival of outsiders, either through pro-Russian employment policies, restrictive 
immigration laws, or by providing more robust social safety nets.  
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V. OIL CURSE SCENARIO 
This final scenario assumes that Russia will become a rentier state whose budget 
relies very heavily on the energy sector.  This creates political and economic distortions 
with decidedly negative consequences for both democratic governance and economic 
development beyond the energy sector.  More broadly, the oil curse inhibits Russia’s 
ability to capitalize on globalization trends, marginalizing it as a global player outside of 
the realm of energy and energy politics.  The country increasingly turns inward, out of 
step with its European neighbors.  Meanwhile, domestic economic problems arising from 
the unbalanced economy eventually lead to popular unrest as Russians begin to question 
the legitimacy of the ruling regime.  Many characteristics of the oil curse scenario are 
compatible with the traditional patterns of authoritarian rule in Russia discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
Should this scenario come to fruition, efforts to address existing weaknesses and 
increase investment in the agricultural sector would be frustrated.  Additionally, the 
strong ruble resulting from the influx of petrodollars would make Russian agricultural 
goods less competitive abroad.  The net results would include stagnating or declining 
agricultural production, depressed rural development, and a continuing population exodus 
from the countryside.  
A. THE RUBLE AS A PETROCURRENCY 
One of the most damaging effects arising from overreliance on energy exports is a 
phenomenon often referred to “Dutch Disease,” after the country in which it was first 
identified.  It is a condition characterized by an economy in which one sector, often tied 
to natural resource extraction, comes to dominate the country’s exports with deleterious 
effects on other export sectors.  In a country such as Russia that relies heavily on oil 
exports to sustain the economy, the danger is that the exchange rate will come be driven 
by global oil prices, or even speculation regarding future oil prices, rather than by the 
fundamentals of its non-oil trade balance.  This commonly results in an overvalued 
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exchange rate that harms the competitive position of non-oil exports.  In some cases this 
can trigger deindustrialization or prevent meaningful industrial development beyond the 
oil sector.119    
Some economists suggest that the process described above is already underway in 
Russia, but the extent to which the country currently suffers or will suffer from Dutch 
Disease is debatable.  Those arguing in favor of a positive diagnosis have suggested that 
Russia began suffering its effects several years ago as its oil-fired economic recovery 
began.  They cite evidence such as an apparent correlation between the ruble exchange 
rate and the dollar-denominated price of oil, the increasing share of natural resource 
exports as a proportion of total exports, and the federal budget’s increasing reliance on oil 
revenues.120  Indeed, over the past two decades Russia has suffered considerable 
deindustrialization, which is perhaps the most prominent marker of Dutch Disease.  
However, the degree to which this is attributable to the oil curse is unclear.  Even before 
the oil boom of the past decade, deindustrialization was already a recognized 
phenomenon in post-Soviet Russia as unproductive communist era enterprises were 
downsized or eliminated.121  This supports the position of economists who argue that 
Dutch Disease does not apply in Russia, or that even if the Russian economy does 
manifest some of the curse’s symptoms, it does not necessarily follow that the country 
suffers from the condition.122  There is a considerable body of evidence and scholarly 
literature demonstrating that large, diversified economies are often able to avoid or 
mitigate the risks associated with Dutch Disease after a major resource discovery.  
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Indeed, although the condition was first identified in the Netherlands in the 1970s after a 
large natural gas discovery made it a notable energy exporter, that country was able to 
maintain diversified economic growth in spite of the economic dislocations that the 
discovery apparently helped cause.  Norway today presents a similar case: it retains a 
vibrant, diversified economy even though oil extraction is a major contributor to GDP.123  
At present there is no clear consensus as to whether Russia suffers from Dutch Disease or 
if it will in the future. 
Nevertheless, if one assumes that the oil curse will bring about a troublesome rise 
in the exchange rate, the negative effects could be considerable for the Russian 
agricultural sector.  As noted in previous chapters, much of its future growth potential is 
tied to it ability to sell goods competitively on international markets.  Dutch Disease 
could derail these prospects.  Russian farmers’ expenses, including seed, fuel, fertilizer, 
equipment, capital improvements, and wages, are mostly denominated in rubles.  Yet 
transactions conducted on international markets are usually denominated in dollars.  An 
overvalued exchange rate would mean that when a farmer sells his goods abroad, the 
dollars he receives are worth fewer rubles.  In effect, the overvalued exchange rate acts as 
an additional tax, reducing his profit margin and increasing costs relative to farmers in 
other countries.  On a macro level, this will tend to depress exports.  Simultaneously, the 
inability to make money by exporting goods could result in a glut in domestic markets, 
depressing prices there as well.  At that point the government would likely be obliged to 
set a price floor.  Nevertheless, the incentives for farmers to expand production would be 
limited.  Likewise, capital investment would be less likely to flow into the agricultural 
sector given the challenging market environment.  
B. ENERGY DOMINANCE AND RENT-SEEKING 
Another troublesome feature of the oil curse is the potential for oil wealth to 
affect the thinking of both political leaders and businessmen.  When a single resource 
becomes the dominant source of a country’s wealth it can obviate the need to invest in the 
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future.  Oil may appear to be a limitless source of easy money.  As one analysis 
succinctly explains, “… a country may become accustomed to a lifestyle which is paid 
for by oil sales rather than productivity increases.”124  This pernicious tendency could 
encourage underinvestment in non-oil infrastructure, including agriculture, and result in a 
failure to develop institutions supportive of a market-driven agricultural sector.  Either of 
these developments would impair Russia’s ability to recognize its agricultural potential. 
Beyond underinvestment, another facet of the oil wealth conundrum is its 
potential to encourage poor economic policies.  When oil money appears to be flowing 
readily, political leaders often attempt to use the windfall to avoid painful changes that 
would actually be beneficial in the long term.  For example, money-losing enterprises 
might be subsidized in order to avoid the dislocations that a closure might cause.  While 
beneficial in the short run, especially for workers who don’t have to look for new 
employment, over time such measures prevent rationalization of economic production 
and cause the country to fall behind its peers in term of productivity.  Thus, oil wealth 
can indirectly undermine long-term prospects.  This situation describes a “rentier” state 
that is reliant on resource income rather than taxation to sustain itself.125  The oil curse 
idea holds that since rentier states do not rely on their citizens for taxes, they are less 
inclined toward good governance.126  The problems associated with the rentier mentality 
usually appear most prominently when economic forces disrupt oil income and leaders 
are forced to recognize that, despite previous appearances, oil is not a limitless cash cow.  
It follows that if the oil curse makes Russia a rentier state, the regime should be 
expected support the agricultural status quo.  Subsidies would be offered to producers, 
government policies would attempt to maintain production, and safety nets would be 
designed to keep farmers and other agricultural actors somewhat satisfied.  Skeptics of 
the current regime might argue that this is an apt description of agricultural policy during 
the Putin/Medvedev era and therefore evidence that Russia is already be suffering from 
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an oil curse.  This would be a misinterpretation.  Although government policy has 
included some of these features, far from attempting to maintain a status quo, the 
regime’s policy goals have tended to be transformative in nature.  The underlying 
ambitions of land reform, market interventions, and agricultural supports have been to 
facilitate and manage change in ways that increase overall productivity.  Under the oil 
curse scenario, this would not be the case.  Maintaining order would be the primary 
policy aim, and therefore potentially disruptive policies and measures (such as land 
reform) would be studiously avoided.  
One of the defining characteristics of a rentier state is a business elite that derives 
its wealth and power not from the productivity of its business enterprises, but rather from 
its influence in political circles.  The focus of this group is not on operating their 
enterprises in the most efficient manner, but rather using their wealth and positions to 
influence the political system in their favor.  Sometimes referred to as “crony capitalism,” 
such a dynamic would also be detrimental to agricultural interests.  Because the economic 
importance of oil dwarfs that of agriculture, in such a system there is little chance that 
agricultural interests would be championed among the few favored elites.  Consequently, 
the agricultural sector would generally suffer the neglect of a regime far more concerned 
with keeping the oil money flowing.  Certainly there would be token gestures of support, 
but, as noted above, there would be little incentive to undertake painful structural reforms 
that the sector needs to thrive in the longer term.127 
C. THE OIL CURSE, AGRICULTURE, AND VILLAGERS 
The developments discussed above would have serious implications for the way 
Russia is viewed both at home and aboard.  At a time when globalization is opening up 
more of the world to outside influences and binding disparate regions more closely to one 
another socially and economically, Russia would represent a notable exception to trend.  
As its politics and economy came to be dominated by oil related interests, it would find 
itself increasingly out of step with its European neighbors.  This would likely engender a 
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sense of isolation, causing the country to turn inward.  Meanwhile, domestic problems 
arising from the unbalanced economy, and possibly its failure to generate sufficient 
employment, would lead to popular dissatisfaction with the ruling regime.  In such a 
context agriculture would be just one element of a broader and potentially troubling 
national mosaic.  Nevertheless, its role and place within that mosaic are worthy of 
consideration. 
Under the oil curse scenario, the vitality that has characterized the agricultural 
sector over the past decade would likely give way to renewed stagnation as political and 
economic elites begin to focus almost solely on the oil sector.  The growth in agricultural 
investment experienced in recent years would recede as the uncertain climate reduces 
future prospects.  While a return to the dismal lows of the 1990s is unlikely, overall 
productivity would languish or decline modestly as farmers are shut out of the export 
market by the overvalued ruble.  Under such conditions the sector would become ever 
more dependent on the government for access to essential inputs, financing, and 
subsidies.  Governmental measures would be expected to address immediate problems 
and keep the sector afloat, but would avoid tackling the underlying systemic and 
institutional causes.  
As always, those most directly affected by these developments would be the 
villagers who rely on agriculture either directly or indirectly for their livelihoods.  
Because the oil curse would generally inhibit rural growth and development, one could 
expect the exodus from the countryside to the city to continue and even accelerate. The 
perceived disparity between rural and urban areas with respect to quality of life would 
increase.  The depopulation of less fertile regions posited by Ioffe et al. would become 
more pronounced as individuals and family seek better prospects.128  As in the past, 
young people would be the most likely to leave, depriving their villages of their vitality 
and energy.  More broadly, depressed development would likely make it even more 
difficult for rural Russia to address its longstanding social problems.  Alcoholism, 
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chronic unemployment, and unsatisfactory access to healthcare and social services, are all 
conditions that could be expected to persist or perhaps become even more acute.   
The impairments of the rural labor force would continue to challenge farm 
managers desperate for the qualified workers and professionals essential to the operation 
of a modern agricultural enterprise.  If, as anticipated, the oil curse causes Russia to focus 
inward, it might be expected to assume an anti-immigration stance, particularly if poor 
economic conditions fuel perceptions that outsiders are taking Russian jobs.  In this case 
it is less likely that the rural labor issue will be solved in ways that introduce large 
numbers of non-Russians into rural villages.  
Assessing the probability of the oil curse scenario depends heavily on whether or 
not one believes that, despite the significant role of oil within its economy, Russia will 
successfully avoid Dutch Disease and the governance problems commonly associated 
with oil wealth.  On this account, there is actually considerable cause for optimism.  
Although politically leaders have understandably paid close attention to oil issues, there 
is little indication that oil interests have exerted outsize influence on decision making.  In 
fact, the Kremlin has consistently moved to thwart the political ambitions of oil oligarchs 
and often pursued policies detrimental to oil interests.  It also has refrained from exerting 
direct state control over oil assets and, unlike most petrostates, allows international oil 
companies to hold ownership stakes in Russian concerns.129  In short, governmental 
behavior to date indicates that, while influential, oil considerations are just one of the 
factors affecting political and economic decision making.  Moreover, when one considers 
the actual value of Russia’s oil exports on a per capita basis, it becomes clear that oil 
income does not play the outsized role that it does in the states most commonly 
associated with the resource curse.  Simply put, oil exports fall far short of allowing the 
Russian government to “live off its rents.”130  In light of these facts the likelihood of this 
scenario coming to fruition is considered to be low (less than 20%.) 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Scenario development is a useful tool for envisioning what the future might look 
like.  By closely examining current trends and considering how they may by influenced 
under different development contexts, it is possible to develop a set of projections that 
help conceptualize what the future might look like.  Scenarios depicting the future course 
of Russian development tend to focus on images involving transformation toward liberal 
democracy, continuation of the status quo, and a return to traditional authoritarianism 
characterized by a government suffering from some form of resource curse. 
When utilized to envision how agricultural development might proceed over the 
coming decade, these scenarios provide valuable insights into future possibilities.  If 
prudently managed, a transition toward a liberal democratic political and economic 
system offers the greatest potential for Russia to meet its full agricultural potential.  
However, this scenario also presents some of the greatest challenges because it would 
require the country to embark on an ambitious program of institution building and to 
redefine traditional relationships between government and society.  The status quo 
scenario would allow the country to continue the conservative approach to agricultural 
development that has reinvigorated the sector over the past decade.  Yet, the readily 
apparent limitations of this approach bring into question its ability to sustain robust 
growth in coming years.  If the Russian government falls victim to the oil curse and 
comes to exhibit even more authoritarian tendencies that isolate it from the rest of the 
developed world, agricultural development can be expected to stagnate as the rentier state 
focuses its efforts on maintaining the flow of oil revenue.  The neglect suffered by the 
non-oil sector of the economy would preclude efforts to meaningfully address the 
problems faced by agriculture. 
The past twenty years have been a truly remarkable period for Russian 
agriculture.  In the space of a single generation the rural landscape has been transformed 
from one dominated by state controlled kolkhozes into one where private enterprise is the 
motivating principle.  The journey has not been easy, and the sector as a whole is only 
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now beginning to fully recover from the wrenching dislocations experienced.  
Nevertheless, today there is considerable cause for optimism.  The problems facing the 
agricultural economy are far less daunting than in previous years.  Even more 
significantly, the broader economic resurgence has given the country the resources 
required in order to meaningfully address its problems.  As a result, the issues the 
agricultural sector must contend with over the next ten years are imminently manageable.  
The critical task will be mustering the needed political will.  That may prove to be that 
greatest challenge of all. 
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